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THE EMERGENCE OF COLLABORATIVE RESPONSES TO COMMUNITY SAFETY
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, Public Safety Canada hosted a Summit on the Economics of Policing to discuss
a problem regarding the sustainability of public policing. Increasing demands for public safety
have been met with decreasing police budgets. The acknowledgement of this problem by Public
Safety Canada (PSC) initiated the push towards new collaborative models of community safety,
often referred to as “Situation Tables” (Russell & Taylor, 2014). Situation Tables seek to
mitigate acutely elevated risks of crime and/or victimization in the community through multisectoral intervention (Nilson, 2014). Collaborative in their orientation, Situation Tables are
described as engaging citizens, police, and community stakeholders in developing “integrated
community safety approaches to get at the roots of crime” (PSC, 2013). Involving citizens in the
“co-production of community safety” is purported to foster a “collective impact” for
communities (Hope, 2005).
The outcome of Public Safety Canada’s Summit was a Shared Forward Agenda, which
listed “improved community safety models by all police services, in conjunction with other
social services” as a key objective (Steering Committee, 2013, pg. 4). In order to achieve this
objective, pilot projects were launched across Ontario to provide “collective coordination and
support to implement new models of community safety” (PSC, 2013). Situation Tables have
been central to these pilot projects, and they illustrate the movement towards pluralized policing
and the growth of security networks (Sanders & Langan, 2016). Situation Tables also
demonstrate the incorporation of “welfare organizations” (such as social service agencies) into
the network of pluralized policing. The network of pluralized policing, until recently, has
traditionally involved only public and private security actors, such as public police and private
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security firms, which arguably have a distinctly different aim (Crawford, 2001; Palmer &
Whelan, 2006).
With the growing governmental push towards collaborative models of community safety,
it is important to understand how these new models of plural policing work, and what the
implications of these initiatives are for members of the community that are involved with them.
Previous program evaluations of Canadian Situation Tables have focused largely on quantitative
outputs, such as number of situations concluded and number of situations where risk has been
mitigated (Babayan et al., 2015; Nilson, 2014), with little qualitative evaluation of outcomes –
that is, how these Tables are perceived to operate and the perceived implications of these
initiatives for individuals at risk. Sanders and Langan (2016) have criticized this focus on
organizational outputs and argued instead for evaluations that qualitatively explore the outcomes
of Situation Tables for the clients served. Crawford (1998) describes “outcomes” as the
consequences of service activities for the wider community. He cautions outputs taking
precedence over outcomes because social goals, such as safety and well-being, may become
eclipsed by organizational goals, such as crime reduction. Palmer & Whelan further warn there is
a danger of policing networks becoming “self-steering inter-organizational networks with no
democratic accountability” (2006, pg. 461). As such, there are growing concerns that policing
networks will be able to evade democratic controls that have been put in place to restrain police
power, thereby rendering larger societal issues outstanding (Crawford, 2001).
While quantitative “risk mitigation” outputs have been utilized in an attempt to
demonstrate organizational accountability, qualitative accounts of the implications of risk-driven
intervention for individuals at risk from both the perspective of service providers involved with
interventions and the clients served are missing (Sanders & Langan, 2016). And yet, it is these
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qualitative accounts that would more democratically measure the success of initiatives. As
Nilson (2015) points out, having the perspectives of service providers and clients will “deepen
and enrich our understanding of the impact that collaborative risk-driven initiatives may have on
clients” as well as provide insight on “multi-sector teams offering supports through an
intervention process” (pg. 20). The limited modes of accountability for modern “interorganizational policing networks” (Loader, 2000) become even more apparent when turning to
the academic literature on collaborative responses to crime control and the evaluative literature
on community safety and well-being initiatives (Babayan et al., 2015; Nilson, 2015). The impact
of these initiatives for individuals at risk is extremely limited, in both of these areas of literature,
signifying the minimal accountability of initiatives and a gap in knowledge.
My research addresses this gap in knowledge by conducting a qualitative analysis of
service providers’ perspectives regarding one Situation Table, the CPRIT1, operating in a midsize urban city in Ontario, to provide a micro-level analysis of the growing trend toward
collaborative responses to community safety within a Canadian context. My research explores a)
how Situation Tables are intended to operate, from the standpoint of the Ontario Working Group
(OWG), and b) how social service providers involved with the CPRIT perceive it to operate and
perceive its implications for individuals at risk. Drawing upon theorizing in plural policing
(Loader, 2000), my study seeks to answer the following three research questions: (1) How do
OWG documents want Situation Tables to operate and contribute to the broader goals of
community safety and well-being? (2) How do social service providers perceive the CPRIT to be
operating? And; (3) What do social service providers perceive to be the implications of the
CPRIT for individuals at risk?
1

To ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of those who participated in this study, I have used
the acronym CPRIT, which stands for Community Partners Risk Intervention Table.
3

To answer these questions, I conducted a detailed document analysis of seven Ontario
Working Group (OWG) documents, which are intended to guide how Situation Tables operate. I
also conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with seven members of the CPRIT, to
understand how this Situation Table is perceivably operating and the perceived implications of
this initiative for individuals at risk. From my document and interview analysis, I argue that
Situation Tables present as state-centric networks, which operate as novel technologies of control
that extend state control through responsibilizing service providers and individuals for risk
mitigation. Additionally, I argue that the managerial undertone of Situation Tables further
marginalizes those at risk.

CHAPTER OUTLINE
In Chapter One, I begin with an examination of this study’s epistemological foundation,
through an exploration of the theoretical frameworks of plural policing and neoliberal governing.
I then review the academic literature available on collaborative responses to community safety,
in order to situate my research study within the context of both the theoretical frameworks and
existing empirical work.
Chapter Two provides a case study description of community safety and well-being
initiatives in Ontario. Chapter Three outlines the research methodologies that were utilized
within the completion of this project. Specifically, I outline my document analysis and semistructured interviews and provide a description of how data were categorized, analyzed, and
theorized using constructivist grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014).
In Chapter Four, I begin by introducing the thematic areas that emerged within my
document analysis. I then discuss how Situation Tables are framed within OWG documents as
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state-centric entities that responsibilize service providers and individuals for risk mitigation. I
argue that this state-centric approach serves to further marginalize community members ‘at risk’.
In Chapter Five, I look at the lived experiences of service providers, including police,
who have been involved with implementing a Situation Table to see how they perceive it to be
operating and the perceived implications for individuals at risk. From this analysis, I argue that
service providers’ accounts of CPRIT table practices are closely aligned with the OWG’s
organizational framework. Specifically, I demonstrate how the CPRIT facilitates the process of
responsibilization through state ‘steering’ and agency ‘rowing’ that is reinforced through the
managerial culture of risk mitigation that frames the CPRIT’s implementation and evaluation. In
Chapter Six, I provide a summary of the research findings and discuss the practical and
theoretical implications of this work, as well as put forth potential avenues for future research.

5

CHAPTER ONE – PLURAL POLICING & COMMUNITY SAFETY
Introduction
In what follows, I begin with a review of the literature on plural policing, drawing
specific attention to the debate surrounding state-centric versus nodal governance. I then review
the concepts and implications of responsibilization and neoliberal governing, as these relate to
collaborative responses to community safety. Next, I discuss the literature on how communitybased organizations and individuals “at risk” have been impacted by previous collaborative
responses to community safety. Finally, I conclude with how my research on Situation Tables, a
new collaborative risk-driven community safety and well-being initiative, provides a useful
empirical case study to explore the changing policing landscape in Canada.

Plural Policing
In light of Public Safety Canada’s push towards new collaborative models of community
safety, we have witnessed a shift in crime control towards the pluralization of policing. Plural
policing is best described as a form of crime control that is affected through a network of service
providers who are tasked with the responsibility of delivering policing and risk management
(Loader, 2000). Central to plural policing has been the “responsibilization” of community-based
organizations and the development of risk management strategies that pervade the criminal
justice system (Palmer & Whelan, 2006). Responsibilization is defined as, “a strategy that
involves the central government seeking to act upon crime not in a direct fashion through state
agencies, but instead acting indirectly, seeking to activate action on the part of non-state
agencies” (Garland, 1996, pg. 452). This responsibilization strategy has been proposed as the
solution to increasing public demands for safety and security, with decreasing state resources to
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deliver that security (Hope, 2005). In getting community-based organizations to take
responsibility for crime prevention and control, the state becomes relieved of being the sole
bearer of the burden of delivering crime reduction to society (ibid).
This shift in discourse toward plural policing demonstrates how policing is increasingly
being provided by, “networks of public, private, and welfare organizations” (Sanders & Langan,
2016, pg. 4). These new “security networks” (Dupont, 2004) have resulted in communities and
individuals increasingly being “expected to contribute to their own regulation, security, and
safety” (Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009, pg. 366). Plural policing is, therefore, a means by which
social control is maintained in democratic societies (Loader, 2000). In democratic societies,
communities are expected to self-regulate and entrust crime control to social institutions. Plural
policing is more intrusive than the traditional reach of the public police because it has the ability
to extend control beyond the realms relevant to policing into all areas of social life (Bayley &
Shearing, 1996). As Palmer and Whelan (2006) argue, we are only “free” in so much as we
engage in self-governing practices that meet societal standards of risk mitigation.
Within the theorizing on plural policing, there are disagreements about the role of the
state in policing networks. On the one hand, some scholars argue that these networks are statecentric (Cherney et al., 2006; Crawford, 2006), while on the other hand, there are scholars who
argue that safety and security are produced through a nodal governance model (Brewer, 2015;
Wood & Dupont, 2006). At the centre of this theoretical debate is the question of who holds the
most power. A state-centric (steering) model views public police as “playing a central role in
creating networks” and “brokering alliances” (Cherney et al., 2006, pg. 379) seeking to “govern
at a distance” the “policing activities of other non-state parties” (Crawford, 2006, pg. 466). In
contrast, a nodal (networking) model views plural policing providers as being “linked together in
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the co-production of safety and security through horizontal partnerships” (ibid). Power, within a
nodal governance model, is fluid and ever changing because there are brokers of crime control
that “bridge network barriers, modulate the flow of network resources, and mobilize
connections” (Brewer, 2015, pg. 1). Power, therefore, becomes a product of how brokers are able
to “connect, direct, and influence networks” at any given time (Brewer, 2015, pg. 9). This notion
of power as being fluid within nodal networks is contrary to the state-centric framework of plural
policing, wherein, power is fixed and controlled by the state. These two models – state-centric
and nodal governance – will be discussed in further detail below.

State-Centric vs. Nodal Governance
Within the state-centric framework, governance is carried out hierarchically, with the
public police being the sole and central “broker of public safety” that “harnesses” the crime
control capacities of external partners in the delivery of community safety (Cherney, 2008, pg.
635). Public police are therefore the main representative of the state, in the realm of delivering
community safety. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) provide a nautical analogy for understanding the
position of the state within the state-centric framework (as cited by Crawford, 2006). They
conceptualize the state as maintaining control over the ‘steering’ functions (e.g., setting goals
and monitoring the achievement of those goals) while agencies do the ‘rowing’ (e.g., crime
preventative work on the ground). The state mobilizes and empowers external agencies that act
as surrogate regulators through service provision (Crawford, 2006). Pluralized policing has,
therefore, created “novel technologies of control” that extend state control over behavioural
compliance and increase state capacity (Crawford, 2006, pg. 454). As Palmer and Whelan (2006)
explain, a state-centric approach expands and extends public police powers by increasing state
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surveillance and intervention based on risk. Loader (2000, pg. 332) goes so far as to term
policing networks the “new sociology of governance” because there has been an emergence of
multi-level forms of governance, where power has remained state-centric, and yet service
delivery is no longer subject to democratic control. As stated above, within democratic societies
crime control is entrusted to social institutions, with the expectation that these institutions will be
subject to controls. The “principle of public justice” (Loader, 2000, pg. 337) drives the
enactment of such controls and states that public service providers should consider the impact of
decisions made. A consideration of the impact of decisions made, by respecting the rights and
interests of all members of society, is what ensures that social institutions affecting crime control
are subject to democratic control and accountability (Loader, 2000). Without democratic controls
in place, the state-centric model cannot ensure that the implications of pluralized crime control
are considered for the organizations involved and the people they serve (Dupont, 2004).
Within the nodal model, governance is carried out non-hierarchically “by a range of
actors (nodes) according to different positions of power” (Wood & Dupont, 2006, pg. 4). The
state is, therefore, “one node amongst many” and governance is “a property of the network”
rather than “a produce of the centre” (Crawford, 2006, pg. 458). Governance, in this model, is far
more complex and requires an “interplay of many agencies” steering and rowing at different
times (Johnston & Shearing, 2003). This interplay of agencies is why nodal governance has been
framed as consisting of horizontal partnerships that co-produce safety and security and coordinate in the creation and execution of goals (Crawford, 2006). The notion of multiple
“brokers” of crime control offers new insights into how the delivery of security is shaped by its
actors (nodes) (ibid).
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Actors are able to utilize different forms of capital as strategic assets within security
networks (Dupont, 2004). The capital held by each actor (such as economic, political, cultural, or
symbolic) provides the ability for actors to maximize their position in the network (ibid). Public
police, as an agency aligned with the state, have a significant amount of economic and political
capital. They have also amassed a considerable amount of cultural and symbolic capital. Within
security networks, expertise constitutes cultural capital and with expertise, comes the symbolic
legitimacy of an agency and its power to speak with authority to other actors (ibid). Public police
have access to data and crime control technology and can utilize these forms of capital to
leverage their position as knowledge brokers within security networks (ibid). Exploring the
internal characteristics of nodes enables an analysis of “how power is created and exercised
within a social system” (Burris, 2004, pg. 341). It also enhances our understanding of how
contemporary crime control and plural policing networks have been designed and employed
(Brewer, 2015).
Research conducted on plural policing networks in Canada notes that although Situation
Tables may appear to be nodal, and are often characterized as nodal, upon review of their
internal characteristics they are arguably state-centric (Sanders & Langan, 2016). For example,
Sanders and Langan (2016) conducted a study on the development of a Situation Table in
Ontario, where they found that during the initial stages of Table development, police were
actively involved in recruiting social service providers. Once developed, the police continued to
take the lead in chairing Table discussions and accompanying service providers to interventions.
Police, therefore, retained power throughout Table development and implementation (ibid). The
police also secured government funding, promoted risk factors associated with crime and
disorder, and developed performance measures. These performance measures (e.g., number of
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situations concluded) are aligned with the quantitative goals of crime and disorder reduction
typically focused on by police (ibid). Sanders and Langan’s research findings reflect a statecentric model of governance that involved active steering by police, who set goals and monitored
initiative performance. More specifically, police connected, directed, and influenced the
governance of risk, by connecting Table members and directing the Table process (for similar
results see Brewer, 2015; Crawford, 2006). Within state-centric networks, the state often
develops “mechanisms for checking, verifying and monitoring performance against the goals,
norms and values set” (Crawford, 2006, pg. 453). Yet, it is important to explore who leads plural
policing networks because the organizational culture of policing, as an anchor with cultural
authority in the state-centric framework, can hinder genuine community mobilization wherein
community safety is to be “co-produced” (Crawford, 2006; Hope, 2005; Jamieson, 2008). The
state-centric framing identified by Sanders and Langan (2016) supports the argument that, in
their study of a Situation Table, the power of the state has been extended through responsibilized
networks that engage in neoliberal governing (Crawford, 2006; Palmer & Whelan, 2006).

Plural Policing as Neoliberal Governing
Plural policing as a theoretical framework provides a “common conceptual platform to
interpret the complexification of security provision, across a spectrum of configurations”
(Dupont, 2004, pg. 87). O’Malley (1992) argues that the shift toward plural policing – whether it
be state-centric or nodal governance – fits with Foucault’s concept of governmentality, which
pertains to the governance of conduct through “technologies of power”. Through plural policing
networks, the crime control capacities of non-state actors are utilized as modes of power that
extend state control over the behavioural conduct of members of society that are seen as posing a

11

risk to the social order. Foucault’s “technologies of power” suggest that those in power employ
disciplinary strategies to identify and intervene in the lives of “problem individuals” who present
as a threat to the social order because they deviate from what is deemed to be “normal”
(O’Malley, 1992, pg. 253). Technologies of power, therefore, act as conduct-governing practices
that seek to govern and manage risk, in order to reduce the negative impact of disorderly conduct
on public sense of security (O’Malley, 1992; Rose, 2000).
The political advancement of risk and uncertainty, within the context of public security,
has driven the emphasis that is being placed on the identification of risk factors. The heightened
concerns that abound around risk factors are utilized to create governable spaces and subjects
that pose a risk and enable “technologies of power” to manage such risks (O’Malley, 1992). The
Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) in the United Kingdom (UK), for example, demonstrates the
political advancement of risk and governable spaces in the UK. Since its implementation, the
CDA has mandated the development of Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs)
between public police and community agencies, who are to act in partnership to implement crime
prevention strategies that mitigate risk (Crawford, 2001). Specifically, the CDA has provided
members of CDRPs with the authority to mitigate risks of crime and disorder through AntiSocial Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) which prohibit disorderly conduct and exclude persons
responsible for disorderly conduct from particular places to ensure community safety (Hope,
2005). By utilizing ASBOs, collaborative partners are able to instill social control, decreasing the
visibility of social disorder and increasing public sense of security. Under neoliberal governance,
technologies of power extend beyond concerns specifically directed at public security to include
the identification of risk and the governance of conduct within various areas of social life. Such
conduct-governing practices are intended to mitigate risk and extend state governance into social
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domains (Kelly, 2001). One example of a conduct-governing practice is the governance of
behavioural conduct at school. In this area of social life for youth, the risk of not making the
proper transition to adulthood is mitigated by the compulsory practice of attending classes and
demonstrating controlled behaviour.

Preventative Partnerships in Community Safety
Technologies of power require forms of expertise to mobilize new techniques and modes
of control (Rose, 2000). In the realm of crime control, public police are seen as the predominant
form of expertise and they utilize risk-based models (often referred to as actuarial models of risk)
as crime prevention strategies (Goddard, 2012). For example, the Integrated Justice Service
Project in Calgary, Alberta was created by police to enhance services for offenders who are at a
high risk of reoffending. The Project focuses on known risk factors that are associated with
criminal behaviour and offers support services at one location to mitigate those risk factors
(Thompson & Schutte, 2010). The Safe Communities Resource Centre is a component of the
Project, which provides a “one stop shop” of support services, based upon offenders’ assessed
level of risk and need. Actuarial risk-based models assume “all action is calculable in terms of
risk” and involve communities taking responsibility for risk management and public security
(Kelly, 2001, pg. 25). In risk management environments, the work of agencies is structured
around an array of risk factors that are associated with an increased likelihood of criminal and/or
disorderly conduct (ibid). Within this model, there is a threshold that defines the level of risk that
is “acceptable” to experts (Rose, 2000).
To date, there has been little research that explores how social service providers perceive
and respond to actuarial risk-based models set by their workplaces. Consequently, little is known
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about how service providers construct risk and the implications these constructions have for
those being labeled “at risk” (Goddard, 2012). Yet, there appears to be an imaginary moral
consensus among agents of control regarding what constitutes risk and how it should be
calculated (Kelly, 2001). Further, the consequences of the threshold of acceptable risk for those
subject to risk classification and governance are not taken into consideration (Rose, 2000).
Power is maintained through defining acceptable risk and generating conduct-governing
practices based upon this definition, without the input or consideration of those subject to the
definition and the practices that arise as a result (ibid). Within the risk-based framework, at-risk
individuals are seen as making the rational choice to either commit and/or prevent criminal
behaviour and are perceived as being in control of the factors that place them at risk of crime
and/or victimization (Liebenberg et al., 2015; O’Malley, 1992). By viewing these persons as
rational actors, at-risk individuals become responsible for their own risk mitigation, while the
larger systemic issues that place them at risk (such as poverty, lack of access to housing,
education, and health care services) are buried and left underexplored (O’Malley, 1992).
Relying upon a risk-based model to classify subjects, spaces, or behaviours as “risky”,
and using the risk-based model to mobilize risk interventions on the basis of these classifications,
has resulted in the development of institutionally-structured risk environments, within which risk
is both standardized and individualized (Kelly, 2001). These environments are created by experts
who define risk and utilize risk mitigating techniques within the provision of social service
(ibid). For example, within schools there is an institutionally-structured risk environment where
students’ behaviours are subject to institutional codes of conduct. These environments
standardize risk, by operating under the guidance of universal risk factors, and they also
individualize risk, as needed, to engage in risk mitigation with deviant individuals (ibid). By
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constructing individuals as risky subjects, as opposed to subjects exposed to risk, interventions
can be utilized to responsibilize members of society for their own risk mitigation (Scoular &
O’Neil, 2007). Research available on preventative partnerships among public police and
community agencies have identified a number of implications that are associated with the
implementation of risk-based models of community safety – implications that illustrate this move
toward the individualizing of risk. These implications include: responsibilization and governing
at a distance, managerialism, and a lack of clarity (Crawford, 2001; Garland, 1996; Goddard,
2012; Kelly, 2001). I will discuss each implication, in turn, below.

Responsibilization and Governing ‘at a distance’
Society has arguably shifted from a welfare state to a neoliberal state, wherein welfare
initiatives have been replaced with community-based risk management – outsourcing the state’s
responsibility for ensuring community well-being. (Goddard, 2012). With this shift in discourse,
the community itself is called upon by the state to deliver crime prevention initiatives and to
implement solutions regarding public safety and social control (Bania, 2012; Dunbar, 2011).
Community crime prevention recognizes “the community” as an important institution in the
reduction of crime and victimization and requires members of the community to become both
agents of crime control delivery and targets for intervention (Dunbar, 2011). Neoliberal
governing produces agents that execute governance of the state (i.e., “govern at a distance”) by
actively participating in crime control and working to shape the conduct of those “at risk” (Kelly,
2001). Neoliberal governing also constructs the management of risk as the “responsibility” of atrisk individuals, provoking seemingly autonomous individuals to “prudently manage the DIY
self” (Kelly 2001, pg. 31). By responsibilizing service providers to engage in community safety
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and the mitigation of risk, this “novel technology of control” (Crawford, 2006) shapes the
everyday practices of organizations and the individuals they serve.
For service providers, this shaping means that the needs of clients are often offset by
systems that are more performance-based (i.e., economically driven) than supportive and that
require self-management by individuals (Liebenberg et al., 2015). For example, within the
criminal justice system, the goal is for offenders to be able to actively reduce their own risk of
reoffending. This goal demonstrates that public safety and reduced crime, as more cost efficient
outcomes, override the rehabilitative needs of the offender, such as, psycho-social support. As
identified by Liebenberg et al. (2015), “prioritizing economic principles over social welfare has
resulted in systems that promote the responsibility of the individual through behavioural
regulation rather than invoke collaborative ways to address social problems” (pg. 1008).
Freedland and King (2003) argue that this push towards responsibilization and governing at a
distance reflects the “liberal intent” of “illiberal contracts” between individuals and service
providers in the provision of social service. When examined on a surface level, the systemic
barriers that place these individuals in the position of needing support in the first place are not
taken into consideration. The end result is that individuals enter into social service contracts
“willingly” to gain access to social services, in exchange for the regulation of their behaviour.
For example, an individual that has lost a job can gain access to unemployment financial
support, in exchange for that individual making a regulated attempt at finding alternative means
of employment. So with a “liberal” intent, comes an “illiberal” contractual requirement (ibid)
Social service contracts not only mandate behavioural self-regulation on the part of individuals,
but social service providers as well in that there is an element of organizational accountability.
With the example outlined above, the social service provider at the unemployment office is

16

regulated, by standardized criteria put forth by the state, as to how to distribute unemployment
support and monitor individual attempts at securing means of employment.
Self-regulation of behaviour, for both service providers and individuals, furthers the
notion that communities are now responsible for ensuring their own safety and well-being
(Ransley & Mazerolle, 2009). As a result, there has been a growing use of contractual
arrangements throughout various social arenas that give life to these novel technologies that
behaviourally manage individuals deemed necessary to manage and control (Freedland & King,
2003). Another example of a contractual arrangement is the support services that addictions
counsellors offer drug addicts who are deemed to be at risk of relapse. In this example, drug
addicts are offered support with the stipulation that they not continue to use drugs while in
addictions counselling. If at-risk individuals do use drugs, they may be subject to exclusion from
further drug therapy (Liebenberg et al., 2015). Benefits are, therefore, contingent upon selfregulation (Rose, 2000). These contractual arrangements are often imposed by agencies of the
state and tend to promote an agenda that is different from the needs-based agenda of social
service providers, because they are as much about efficiently managing service provision as
securing individual discipline (Freedland & King, 2003). This state-centric approach places
responsibility for behavioural management on service providers as well as individuals at risk
(Goddard, 2012).

Responsibilization and The Implications for Community-Based Organizations
To examine how much neoliberal crime control has triumphed in the practice of
community crime prevention, Goddard (2012) conducted in-depth interviews with frontline
service providers who carry out risk-based predictions and interventions with “at-risk” youth.
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Goddard identified a mix of approaches among service providers regarding the proper utilization
of risk intervention to mitigate harm. Some providers supported the notion of at-risk youth as
being a threat to public safety in need of behavioural management. Others opposed this notion of
at-risk youth and supported more of a social welfare approach that preferred addressing the
underlying causes of risk. This mix of approaches among service providers has resulted in the
creation of “hybrid arrangements” within the realm of crime control, as community-based crime
prevention actors have their own ideas of how best to address crime and youth at risk (Goddard,
2012). Although most community-based organizations (CBOs) use the Risk Factor Prevention
Paradigm (RFPP) as an actuarial-based resource to identify youth at risk, some service providers
noted that it is less about managing risk than it is about improving social conditions for youth
(ibid). This finding suggests that the neoliberal shift of responsibility for crime control gives
CBOs the perceived ability to tailor their risk management techniques on the ground. Yet,
Goddard (2012) also acknowledges the powerful capabilities of the state to affect the activities of
CBOs. For example, CBOs are encouraged to use the RFPP to target/identify youth “at risk” and
this perceivably sets the tone for how best to govern/act on the risk factors identified (ibid). The
risk factors generated by the RFPP are largely behavioural and dispositional in nature (e.g., antisocial behaviour, or a suspected mental health issue) and describe what and who in society is
“not normal” (i.e., poses a risk and is thus subject to governance).
Although different perceptions of risk may complicate the assumptions of social service
providers as risk managers and the responsibilization strategy as a mechanism of the state, the
use of various performance indicators to demonstrate the state’s return on crime control
investment have been found to be a coercive way to bring CBOs back in line with prevailing
risk-based crime and violence prevention (Goddard, 2012). There is a notion of “power
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dependence” that is built into community governance, as service providers are “free” to intervene
in the lives of at-risk youth, but are subjected to stipulations when doing so (ibid). For example, a
mental health worker that provides mental health services to a youth in need must determine,
within the provision of service, if the risk factor of a suspected mental health issue has been
mitigated – in accordance with pre-determined performance indicators. Addressing needs can
therefore become overshadowed by the need to demonstrate that risk potential has been properly
measured. Thus, research is needed to provide insight into the complex ways that communities
implement and shape risk management. Strategies of responsibilization are not simply neoliberal
offloading of crime control, but a new form of exercising power and governing risk that is
sovereign and adaptive (Garland, 1996; Goddard, 2012). The present study addresses this gap in
knowledge by exploring how Situation Tables shape the management of risk.

Managerial Approaches Foster Uncoordinated Responses
Research that focuses on preventative partnerships for community safety in the UK has
uncovered the “managerial” undertone of these partnerships (Crawford, 2001; 2006).
Managerialism is a paradigm that is driven by performance measurement and has an intraorganizational focus on ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ (Crawford, 2001; Garland, 1996). The
managerial focus on the internal operations within organizations renders co-ordination
problematic for inter-organizational plural policing networks (Crawford, 2001). For example,
there are numerous points of contradictions within crime control policies that mandate
preventative partnerships in the UK. The managerial need to set objectives, specify performance
indicators, and fixate on outputs rather than outcomes are all points of contradiction that
undermine the implementation of a partnership approach to community safety; an approach,
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which requires ‘joined-up’ rather than disjointed forces (Crawford, 2001; Garland, 1996).
Agencies are also treated as undifferentiated in their interests and priority practices, even though
each agency in a partnership will have varying roles and responsibilities within the realm of
service delivery that will be brought to the partnership (Crawford, 2001). For example, public
police may have an interest in reducing crime and prioritize the practice of ensuring public
safety, while mental health workers may have an interest in fostering a supportive environment
and prioritize the practice of ensuring client needs are being met. In addition to diverse
organizational interests and practices, community partners are treated as undifferentiated in their
power and organizational resources to contribute (ibid). This undifferentiated treatment is despite
research findings which indicate that the power to influence decisions regarding community
safety, as well as the organizational resources to contribute to community safety initiatives, are
often unequal within preventative partnerships (Crawford, 2006).
The uncoordinated dispersal of policing and risk management through community safety
partnerships has resulted in a fragmented response, wherein there is a pluralization of service
delivery without a truly “networked” approach. Crawford (2001) argues that this fragmentation
of service delivery results from government policy that exerts control over partnered agencies by
outlining performance measures and setting performance targets. Performance measures, like
police-recorded reductions in crime, foster tunneled-vision on organizational outputs, rather than
wide-angled responsibility for community outcomes (see Crawford, 1998; Crawford, 2001; and
Hope, 2005). Through the use of performance indicators, the emphasis is placed on what
agencies have done, rather than what they have more broadly achieved (Garland, 1996). This
emphasis on prioritizing the attainment of performance targets and indicating efficient use of
resources to governing bodies, over the delivery of quality services and the demonstration of
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accountability to members of the public, has been illustrated within Situation Table analyses
(Nilson, 2015; Sanders & Langan, 2016). These analyses document the evaluative focus on the
quantitative number of situations concluded and reduced calls for police service, without
attending to qualitative inquiry, which would examine how Table interventions are experienced
by both service providers and the clients they serve. Managerialism utilizes “rituals of
performance verification” that serve to legitimize organizational action regarding crime
reduction and promote competition among agencies regarding performance (Crawford, 2001, pg.
67). Competition among agencies hinders co-ordination and inter-agency trust (ibid). Without a
coordinated approach, there is a lack of clarity regarding the organizational roles,
responsibilities, goals and objectives of collaborative risk-driven community safety and wellbeing initiatives.

Lack of Organizational and Definitional Clarity
The challenges created by managerialism are further compounded by a lack of
definitional clarity. Concepts such as “community safety”, “risk”, and “anti-social behaviour” are
subjective in nature and do not have universally agreed upon definitions. Yet, these concepts are
still being measured within initiatives. Upon reviewing the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act,
Crawford (2001) found that “preventative measures” were left undefined, so the government
would not have to contend with the exclusionary dynamics that pervade community safety
tactics. The agencies involved in Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships must therefore
define and agree upon the “preventative measures” that are to be utilized to ensure “community
safety”, despite varying perspectives on how to do so. Also lacking within these partnerships, is a
standard system for defining “anti-social behaviour” and/or collectively identifying instances of
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disorderly behaviour (ibid). To complicate matters further, the increased monitoring of calls
made to police for “disorderly behaviour” expands the focus of governance into non-criminal
situations and areas of social life that produce an increase in the recorded prevalence of crime
and disorder (ibid). An increase in police recording could account for why public perception of
both risk and the need for increased community safety has remained unchanged, despite falling
crime rates. Further, despite public perception, the prevention of risk actually decreased in a
follow-up evaluation of a crime prevention initiative that was implemented in Canada (Babayan
et al., 2015). For this reason, preventative practices, such as identifying and tracking instances of
elevated “risk”, may actually be counter-productive in this regard (Crawford, 2001).
Upon more closely examining points of contradiction within crime control policy in the
UK, Crawford (2001 & 2006) remarks that there is also an ambiguity regarding the goals and
objectives of community safety partnerships. On the one hand, the goal of community safety
partnerships is crime reduction, while on the other hand, it is to generate a broader sense of
public security and well-being. Similar to research in the UK, research on plural policing in
Australia has also identified ambiguity regarding organizational definitions and goals/objectives
for crime prevention, which poses impediments to crime prevention practices (Crawford, 2001;
Cherney & Sutton, 2007). Success, in this context, requires “networked” policing partnerships to
take into account crime reduction, as well as community safety (Palmer & Whelan, 2006).
Partnerships must therefore consider the absence of incidents of crime and disorder, as well as
the impact on the well-being and security of the community, in order to truly evaluate their
effectiveness (ibid). The present study contributes to these bodies of knowledge by exploring to
what extent and how community safety and well-being are both understood and operationalized
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in the context of Situation Tables, as well as how they are measured and evaluated by those
involved in their implementation.

Responsibilization and The Implications for Individuals “At Risk”
Service providers’ perceptions of youth as rational and autonomous in their decision to
engage or not engage with services, without consideration of contextual factors, has resulted in
serious repercussions for youth. As Liebenberg et al. (2015) showed, those who did not present
as “responsibilized” were often banned from further services. Further, case management plans
did not appear to target the underlying causes of “risky behaviour”, but rather its negative
effects. Focusing on the negative effects of risky behaviour indicates the tendency of some
service providers to adopt a neoliberal ideology regarding the management of risk that poses a
threat to public security (ibid). The crime problem then becomes reduced to one of “recalcitrant
individuals unwilling to accept offers of help and support” (Scoular & O’Neil, 2007, pg. 773).
There is an overpowering focus in the literature on preventative partnerships “mitigating
risk” rather than promoting well-being, with little examination of how neoliberal principles of
governance impact service delivery for vulnerable at-risk youth (Liebenberg et al., 2015). And
yet, despite the understudied emergence of collaborative approaches to risk intervention,
responsibility for failed intervention is likely to be attributed to the individual and unlikely to be
attributed to the risk-based model of practice, which lacks contextual specificity, an appreciation
of the diversity of individuals, and an understanding of the social processes and the complexities
of client experiences (ibid). If considered, these client experiences could have a greater impact
on outcomes for vulnerable populations (ibid). By “empowering individuals” to manage their
own risk and demonstrate self-care, accountability is removed from the state. However, by
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implicating individuals in the regulation of their own self-care, the nature of support services is
altered and the end result can be exclusion and further marginalization (Liebenberg et al., 2015;
Mann et al., 2007). When individuals are blamed for the adverse conditions over which they
have no control, this transforms social risk into individual responsibility (Kelly, 2001). The
responsibilization process has been termed the “downward spiral” of neoliberal governance,
where responsibility has completely shifted from the state to the at-risk individual (ibid).

My Study
The literature on plural policing, and its associated concepts, provide a useful framework
for studying Situation Tables. The little empirical research available on Situation Tables has
argued that multi-sectoral collaboration can be an effective tool for mitigating elevated risk and
enhancing community safety and well-being (Nilson, 2014). These research findings are based
upon the premise that once situations of acutely elevated risk are discussed and agreed upon by
members of a Situation Table, interventions provide wrap-around services to individuals by
connecting those in need with the support services they require (Babayan et al., 2015). Acutely
elevated risk (AER) is defined by Situation Table training materials as, “a situation negatively
affecting the health or safety of an individual, family, group, or place, where there is a high
probability of imminent and significant harm to the self or others (e.g. offending or being
victimized, lapsing on a treatment plan, or an overt mental health crisis situation)” (Situation
Table e-modules, 2016, pg. 16). The majority of the research on Situation Tables, however, has
been quantitative in nature and has focused on quantitative performance outputs, which do not
provide an in-depth account of how Situation Tables are operating on the ground and what the
perceived outcomes of Situation Tables are.
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This study is focused on exploring these collaborative partnerships through examining
personal accounts of Situation Table practices. Examining service providers’ accounts will
provide for an understanding of how the concept of acutely elevated risk (AER) is defined and
applied by all of the organizations engaged at the Table, as well as, the implications these
applications of AER have for at-risk individuals. With the changing pluralized policing
landscape, it is important to examine how these new collaborative responses to community safety
and well-being are seen to operate, in order to begin to understand the intended and unintended
consequences of these initiatives for service providers and members of the community who have
been responsibilized for risk mitigation (Liebenberg et al., 2015; Sanders & Langan, 2016).
Thus, it is not just about examining “governing” in diverse contexts, but examining core issues
within those contexts (O’Malley et al., 1997). The theoretical frameworks of plural policing and
neoliberal governing became relevant during my immersion in the data and were utilized to
theoretically analyze the perceived operation and implications of Situation Tables. A case study
description of one Situation Table – the CPRIT – will be presented in the chapter that follows.
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CHAPTER TWO – CASE STUDY
Introduction
In 2013, four municipal police services (Toronto Police, Greater Sudbury Police,
Waterloo Regional Police, and Peel Regional Police) that were engaging in new collaborative
models of community safety, independently, decided to join forces to create the Ontario Working
Group (OWG) on Collaborative, Risk-Driven Community Safety. The OWG has dedicated itself
to “finding collaborative solutions to community challenges” in order to “achieve safety and
well-being for all” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 1). This dedication to finding collaborative
solutions to achieve safety and well-being has involved police services working with consultants
on community crime prevention to develop initiatives that serve to identify and collaboratively
intervene in situations of acutely elevated risk of crime and/or victimization. Once formed, the
Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services saw the OWG as an
authoritative body on collaborative risk-driven community safety and provided financial backing
for initiatives through the Proceeds of Crime (POC) grant (Russell & Taylor, 2014). A
proportion of the POC grant is geared toward “addressing community safety and well-being
through multi-disciplinary approaches that address risk factors associated with crime” (Sanders
& Langan, 2016, pg. 10). Community Situation Tables have since been developed and
implemented in numerous cities across Ontario, through the aid of POC grants and the work of
the OWG.

Description of the Development and Implementation of the CPRIT
The implementation of the CPRIT Situation Table was preceded by a substantial amount
of preparatory work, carried out by the municipal police service. The Police Chief showed an
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interest in the notion of implementing an initiative that mobilizes around community safety and
well-being, and introduced the rest of the police service to the work of the OWG (Babayan et al.,
2015). This introduction involved multiple members of the municipal police service attending a
symposium held by the OWG in 2014 entitled, “New Directions in Community Safety –
Consolidating Lessons Learned about Risk and Collaboration”. During this symposium, the
OWG proposed a framework for community safety planning that included the following: social
development, prevention, risk intervention, and emergency response (Russell & Taylor, 2014,
1A). An image of this framework can be found at Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: The Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-Being
(Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A)

As indicated in Figure 1, initiatives that fall within the social development ring (green ring) are
for promoting and maintaining community safety and well-being, while initiatives in the
prevention ring (blue ring) are for reducing identified risks. Initiatives that fall within the risk
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intervention ring (amber ring) are for mitigating elevated risk situations, while initiatives in the
emergency response ring (red ring) are reserved for immediate responses to urgent incidents.
From this framework, initiatives that focus on “risk intervention” have purportedly been the
quickest to take hold in communities (Russell & Taylor, 2015). After the first OWG symposium,
the municipal police held meetings with members of the community who were considered to
have a stake in community safety (Babayan et al., 2015). The interest demonstrated at these
meetings suggested that multi-sector collaboration for community safety warranted further
exploration. A Police Sergeant from the municipal police service was then appointed to secure
funding through the POC grant and lead the development of an initiative, aimed at “reducing risk
before crisis situations occur” (Babayan et al., 2015, pg. 3). Motivated by the success of other
Ontario communities that have implemented the “hub model” of risk intervention (e.g. the
Gateway “hub” in North Bay), the CPRIT was launched about a year later. Unlike other Situation
Tables operating in Ontario, the CPRIT is unique in that it not only utilizes the Table to deal with
individuals identified as being at acutely elevated risk, but also “to deal, in particular, with the
problem of frequent users of emergency services” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 7).
The CPRIT has garnered the support of over 20 partner agencies from multiple service
sectors, such as: education, public health, mental health, addictions, law enforcement, domestic
violence, victim services, employment support, housing, Aboriginal services, and youth support
(Babayan et al. 2015). Members of the CPRIT meet twice a week for 90 minutes to identify and
discuss situations of acutely elevated risk. In order to be classified as being at “acutely elevated
risk” the risk factors contributing must “cut across multiple service disciplines” (i.e., there must
be two or more risk factors) and the nature of these risks must “significantly increase chances of
harm and/or victimization” (Situation Table e-modules, 2016, pg. 17). The discussions held at

28

Situation Tables are to remain purposeful and directed, through the use of a four-filter approach
to information-sharing (ibid). This four-filter approach, as outlined in the training materials, is
recommended to proceed as follows: Filter One – Internal Agency Screening, Filter Two – DeIdentified Information, Filter Three – Limited Identified Information, and, Filter Four – Planned
Intervention. These four filters are the prescribed policies and procedures and will be discussed
in further detail below.

Description of the Situation Table Stages
During Filter One, agencies are to undertake an internal agency screening process within
their own organization when considering bringing a situation forward to the Situation Table for
multi-sectoral intervention (Situation Table e-modules, 2016). This screening process involves
agencies independently making a determination that a situation is of “acutely elevated risk” and
that the risk factors are beyond the scope of the agency alone (ibid). Part of this determination
urges agencies to consider which Table partners are “reasonably likely to have a role to play in
the development and implementation of intervention to mitigate risk” (Situation Table emodules, 2016, pg. 6). At this stage, agencies must also consider if they have the authority to
disclose relevant personal information about a client, in order to mitigate acutely elevated risk.
During Filter Two, situations are presented to the Table by agencies, using de-identified
data (i.e., data that does not contain any identifying information relating to the client, such as,
client name, date of birth, etc.). Once a situation is presented to the Table, Table members are
asked to collectively determine if the threshold of “acutely elevated risk” (AER) has been met
(ibid). If a consensus is reached that a situation should be classified as “acutely elevated risk”
(i.e., it meets the AER threshold), then the situation is noted as “accepted” in the risk-driven
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database and Table discussion proceeds to Filter Three. If the threshold of “acutely elevated risk”
is not met, however, discussion of the situation ceases and it is noted as “rejected” in the
database (Babayan et al., 2015; Situation Table e-modules, 2016).
During Filter Three, the agency member that brought the accepted situation to the Table
(i.e., the originating agency) will then provide “minimal disclosure” of identifying information,
so that other Table members may consult their own organizational databases for information
pertaining to the client (Situation Table e-modules, 2016). This consultation process serves to
inform future decisions about which agencies will be involved with intervention planning and
execution. Based upon the risk factors that are deemed in need of mitigation, the lead and
assisting agencies are then identified and made note of in the risk-driven database (ibid). All
subsequent discussions regarding client interventions then purportedly take place outside of the
Table. During Filter Four, the Table members that have been identified as having a role to play
in an intervention meet privately to share privacy-protected information about the client that is
pertinent to the intervention (Situation Table e-modules, 2016). Interventions usually occur
within 24 to 28 hours of leaving the Table and are designed to reduce elevated levels of risk
facing individuals in the community, by mobilizing agencies that can offer support and address
risk factors (ibid).

Evaluation of the CPRIT
To date, there is one six-month process evaluation available on the CPRIT. The purpose
of this evaluation was to examine whether the initiative was being implemented as intended and
to assess the initial effects of the initiative on individuals’ acutely elevated risk situations and
community agencies’ service provision and collaboration (Babayan et al., 2015). The evaluation
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used a mixed-methods approach of baseline and follow-up surveys with community agencies,
database analyses, and interviews with service providers. This largely quantitative methodology
thematically covered the following areas: (1) the assessment of risk situations and client
connection to services, using the following information: the number of situations “accepted” and
“concluded”, demographic information, prevailing risk categories, prevailing risk factors,
originating agencies, lead agencies, and assisting agencies (as informed by the Risk Tracking
Database); (2) the facilitators and challenges to initiative implementation (as informed by the
surveys and interviews conducted with agencies); (3) the initial effects on individuals at risk (i.e.
the status of risk situations, as informed by the Risk Factor Tracking Tool); and, (4) the initial
effects on service provision and collaboration (as informed by the surveys and interviews
conducted with agencies) (ibid). The six-month evaluation report found women (55.5%) and
youth/young adults aged 16-24 (35.5%) to be the most frequent clients of the CPRIT. The
evaluation report also noted anti-social behaviour, drugs, diagnosed mental health, suicide,
suspected mental health, and threat to public health and safety as the most frequently identified
risk factors (Babayan et al., 2015). Further, the municipal police service was noted as the
predominant originating agency – referring 73.6% of cases to the Table (ibid).
While the CPRIT was still in the early stages of implementation at the time data was
collected for evaluation, Babayan et al. (2015) concluded that the CPRIT presents as a promising
initiative that is able to improve collaborative working relations among agencies and consolidate
community efforts to increase access to support services for individuals identified as being at
acutely elevated risk. Babayan et al. (2015) noted that future evaluation is warranted, however,
in order to better understand the long-term impact for individuals at risk. Absent from this
evaluation is a qualitative exploration of the implications of the CPRIT for the clients it serves.
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In an attempt to understand the impact of the Table on clients, the CPRIT proposed to utilize a
quantitative Risk Factor Tracking Tool (RFTT). The RFTT has been utilized by lead agencies to
monitor changes in risk situations over time and has indicated the percentage of cases where risk
was either mitigated, being addressed, or still present – 3 months’ post-intervention. To date, the
RFTT presents as the only form of measurement of the initial effects of initiatives for individuals
at risk and RFTT data reports that in a high percentage of cases (38.5%) risk was still present
(ibid). The effects of collaborative risk-driven intervention, therefore, are still largely unknown.
My study addresses one aspect of this gap in knowledge, by conducting in-depth
interviews with service providers involved with the CPRIT, regarding their perceptions of the
implications of intervention for individuals deemed at acutely elevated risk. Now that I have
described the provincial push toward multi-agency collaborative responses to community safety
and well-being, and described the specific Situation Table being studied, I will describe the
methodologies that were utilized to complete this project.
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CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
Introduction
In order to understand how Situation Tables in Ontario are intended to operate, in rhetoric,
and how one Situation Table, the Community Partners Risk Intervention Table (CPRIT), is
perceived to operate, in practice, I utilized a two-pronged qualitative research methods approach
of document analyses and in-depth, semi-structured interviews. In what follows, I first discuss
my use of document analyses and semi-structured interviews. I then outline how I collected,
categorized, analyzed, and theorized the data through a constructivist grounded theory
framework (Charmaz, 2014). Finally, I conclude by reflecting on the data collection process and
the challenges that were encountered throughout the research process.

Document Analysis
In the first phase of this research project, I completed a qualitative document analysis of
seven Ontario Working Group (OWG) reports and resource papers. The qualitative document
analysis that I conducted entailed reviewing extant documents, which are those in which I as a
researcher had no hand in shaping, in order to generate common thematic areas (Charmaz, 2014).
Often used in conjunction with other qualitative research methods, document analyses provide
for a point of objective analysis that can be compared with more subjective observational and/or
interview findings (e.g., a comparison between organizational policies and practices) (ibid). I
retrieved all of the reports and resource papers for my document analysis from the Ontario
Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) website (www.oacp.on.ca/news-events/resourcedocuments/ontario-working-group-owg). Specifically, I collected an initial report (New
Directions in Community Safety – Consolidating Lessons Learned about Risk and
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Collaboration), five resource papers (Framework for Planning Community Safety and WellBeing; Performance Measures for Community Safety and Well-Being; Mitigating Acutely
Elevated Risk of Harm – Considerations in Adopting the Situation Table; Collaborative Analysis
for Systemic Improvements; The Ontario Working Group on Collaborative, Risk-Driven
Community Safety), and one final report (Gaining Momentum – Multi-Sector Community Safety
and Well-Being in Ontario).
Additionally, to supplement my understanding of Situation Tables and the work of the
OWG, I attended two symposiums in October 2015. One symposium was held by the CPRIT and
the other was held by the OWG. I also completed the Situation Table certification program that
is offered online by Wilfrid Laurier University’s Centre for Public Safety and Well-Being in
November 2016. The certification program involved the completion of five e-modules, each
containing a summative quiz, which interactively explain the Situation Table process.

Qualitative Interviews with CPRIT Members
In order to understand how Situation Tables are perceived to be operating, in practice, and what
the perceived implications of Tables are for individuals at acutely elevated risk (AER), I
conducted in-depth, semi-structured interviews with seven members of the CPRIT. Qualitative
interviewing is a research methodology that seeks to uncover the meanings, understandings, and
explanations of specific areas of interest in individuals’ lives (Warren & Karner, 2015). The
qualitative interviewing approach is founded on conversational interaction, “where knowledge is
constructed by the dialogue between the interviewer and the interviewee” (Brinkmann & Kvale,
2014, pg. 2). Prior to conducting any interviews, I attained institutional ethics approval from
Wilfrid Laurier University’s Research Ethics Board (REB #5207).
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Interviews were conducted in person and via telephone and, upon obtaining consent, were
digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim using Express Scribe software. Interviews were
approximately forty-five minutes to one hour in duration and consisted of a series of open-ended
questions that sought to answer the proposed research questions. Using a thematic interview
guide (which has been attached as “Appendix A”), participants were encouraged to provide indepth and detailed responses to questions pertaining to: defining AER and community safety, the
goals and objectives of the Table, the Table process (including client intervention and Table
follow-up), and the perceived implications of the Table for individuals identified to be at AER.

Analysis
All OWG documents and interview transcripts were analyzed using a constructivist
grounded theory methodological approach (Charmaz, 2014). Constructivist grounded theory has
“systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct
theories from the data themselves” (Charmaz, 2014, pg. 1). It is an inductive approach,
generating theoretical insights from iterative strategies that compare data and analyses, in
conjunction with one another (Charmaz, 2014). Constructivist grounded theory requires
continuous engagement with the data, in order to understand participants’ experiences and
accurately reflect these experiences in analysis.
To further demonstrate this iterative strategy of simultaneously comparing data with
analysis, I will give an example of a change that I made to my interview guide during the
interview process. Relatively early on in the interview process, I determined that the CPRIT
more actively utilizes the Risk Tracking Database (RTD) and not the Risk Factor Tracking Tool
(RFTT). The RFTT is exclusive to the CPRIT table and was utilized, initially, in an attempt to
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quantify the impact of the initiative for individuals at AER. My interview guide questions about
the RFTT were based upon a previous evaluation report, prepared in 2015. I therefore altered my
interview guide a little to probe the use of the RTD, as this emerged in my conversations with
participants to be a more standardized measure of the impact.
My analysis utilized the constructivist grounded theory processes of initial coding,
focused coding, and concept mapping. The process of initial coding involves interacting with the
data line-by-line, and summarizing segments of data using a label to define what is explicit
(Charmaz, 2014). For example, an initial code that I developed while interacting with the data
was “mitigating elevated risk of harm”. I coded four transcripts and four documents, by hand,
with line-by-line coding, in the left-hand column of the page. Initial coding of these four
interview transcripts and OWG documents was completed to ensure that I remained grounded in
the data. From these initial codes, I began to see repetitive themes across the data. These broader
repetitive themes were then developed into focused codes. The focused codes I utilized were the
most frequent of the initial codes and what I deemed to be most significant for making sense of
the data (ibid).
At this stage of the coding process, I noticed that the majority of the focused codes that
were emerging in the interview transcripts, were also emerging in the OWG documents. Focused
codes were grounded in the data (such as promoting safety, addressing risk, fostering inclusion,
and mobilizing the community) but also drew upon existing theoretical concepts, such as
responsibilization, utilizing state influence, and managerialism. As the focused codes were
identified, they were incorporated into my codebook and the parameters of each code were
clearly outlined. By clearly outlining the parameters of each focused code, I was able to code
documents objectively and with ease. The focused codes that I developed were active processes
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(for example, “responsibilizing” agencies for the mitigation of risk) (ibid). By developing codes
that were active processes, I was able to capture how service providers perceive the Table to be
operating.
In order to remain grounded in my data and to avoid imposing pre-conceived ideas and
theoretical concepts onto them, my focused codes were constantly examined for their “fit” to the
data, and were revised where not clearly exemplified. All OWG documents and interview
transcripts were focus coded, by hand, in the right-hand column of the page. Upon completion of
the focused coding, I engaged in analytical memoing wherein I wrote about the themes that were
emerging and incorporated quotes from the documents that demonstrated these themes. These
analytic memos also discussed the relation among and between different focused codes and were
used to think through and answer my research questions.
I also engaged in concept mapping to theorize about the relationships between my codes.
Specifically, I used cluster diagrams. A cluster diagram is a higher form of coding that works to
theorize about the data by mapping out the themes and subthemes and link concepts within a
broader analytic frame (ibid). Figure 2 is an example of one of my cluster maps, which
demonstrates the underlying state influence that has shaped the work of the OWG in mobilizing
the community and promoting community safety and the mitigation of risk.
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Figure 2: Cluster Map – Making Sense of the Influence Shaping the OWG

The processes of initial coding, focused coding, and concept mapping, taken together, allowed
me to explore emerging themes in the data and analytically account for what these themes mean,
within the context of my research questions. Collecting these data posed as a challenge, at times,
as will be discussed in further detail in the subsection below.

Reflecting on Power and Control in Qualitative Research
When I started this research project, I proposed to recruit participants through previous
connections that I had made with social service providers in the community where the CPRIT
operates. In February 2017, potential participants were sent a recruitment e-mail and asked to
contact me if they had an interest in participating in the study. I was able to secure four research
participants utilizing this approach. Receiving four positive responses to my research request felt
successful at the time. However, shortly after this initial positive response, I had difficulty
gaining access to other participants. Luckily, my thesis supervisor and committee member had
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contacts in this field and were able to send out a recruitment email on my behalf. Through their
network, I was able to recruit three more research participants – for a total of seven.
Reflecting on my experiences in the field of qualitative research, I found recruitment and
gaining entry to have been my biggest challenges. Early in the interview process, I was
approached by a member of the CPRIT who expressed concern over my research and its
subsequent interpretation. For example, before I could conduct an interview with this person, she
first wanted to meet with me to discuss my interest in the CPRIT and the objectives of my study.
She also asked if member agencies would be able to review my work to “ensure context and
accuracy” and to approve final edits. In addition, she wanted access to the data collected. I
quickly realized that this person held an important role in the CPRIT and that the willingness of
others to participate in the research was greatly influenced by this person’s approval. I met with
this participant and discussed the project, as well as, my practices for ensuring confidentiality
and anonymity of the data collected, as governed by my institutional ethics approval.
Many of the challenges I faced recruiting participants and gaining entry were overcome
by (1) accessing this gatekeeper and (2) drawing upon my thesis committee’s contacts. The
challenges that I encountered in the field, however, speak to the challenges identified by the
OWG regarding evaluating these initiatives. In the final report prepared by the OWG entitled
“Gaining Momentum – Multi-Sector Community Safety and Well-Being in Ontario”, which
discusses the experiences of numerous individuals that have conducted evaluations on Situation
Tables across Ontario, the OWG warns that “evaluation of collaborative, risk-driven community
safety and well-being initiatives can be fraught with challenges that need to be addressed”
(Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 63).
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While this OWG report identifies a number of challenges researchers have faced when
conducting evaluations on Situation Tables across Ontario, they note the following two
challenges that reflect my own experiences: context and imbalance (Russell & Taylor, 2015).
Context, in this realm, refers to any potential pressure from external sources to either “conduct
certain types of evaluations or use certain types of research methods” (Russell & Taylor, 2015,
pg. 63). Pressure to conduct a certain type of evaluation, or to use a certain type of research
method can come from collaborating partners or the broader academic community. Imbalance
refers to “focusing on outcomes and ignoring processes – or vice versa” (Russell & Taylor, 2015,
pg. 64). Thus, those evaluating Situation Tables warned that researchers should strive to be
inclusive in their evaluation of collaborative initiatives and not only analyze the Situation Table
process, but also its impact on those involved.
I perceived my interaction with the concerned member of the CPRIT to be a form of
pressure from an external source. This table member requested to meet with me in the initial
stages of my interview process to offer her assistance and asked if she would be able to ensure
the context of my findings and approve final edits. Although her request was prefaced as concern
for ensuring that my analysis provided “a fair and accurate representation of the initiative”, from
my perspective, this was pressure from a collaborating partner to steer my evaluative findings.
Furthermore, my interviews reflected an imbalance wherein the service providers would
often respond to questions in a way that focused on the processes of the CPRIT, as opposed to
the outcomes for individuals determined to be at acutely elevated risk. Although focusing on
Table processes is presumably what came naturally for participants, I felt a sense of resistance
from providers to speak to the impact for individuals. Service providers were, in a sense,
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somewhat removed from this aspect of the initiative. I therefore experienced both of the
challenges (i.e., context and imbalance) identified by the OWG.

Conclusion
Together, the research methods of documentary analyses and semi-structured interviews
provided for an in-depth qualitative analysis of the CPRIT. These qualitative research methods
complement each other well and they allowed me to compare how Situation Tables are intended
to operate, in rhetoric, with the way that one Situation Table is perceivably operating, in practice.
Given that the majority of the research conducted in the field of collaborative risk-driven
community safety is quantitative in nature, my research fills an important gap in knowledge by
providing the perceptions of social service providers involved with the CPRIT – bringing those
experiences to the forefront. The traditional focus on quantitative research methods and the
challenges of context and imbalance identified above, both evidence the underlying state-centric
‘steering’ of these initiatives.
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CHAPTER FOUR – THE OWG AND THE PLURALIZATION OF COMMUNITY SAFETY
Introduction
Having outlined the methodology employed in the present study, I now describe the
findings from my document analysis of seven Ontario Working Group (OWG) reports and
resource papers (www.oacp.on.ca/news-events/resource-documents/ontario-working-groupowg). The initial report, New Directions in Community Safety (2014), discusses lessons learned
from the “hub” model that utilizes multi-sector collaboration to mitigate imminent risks of crime
and/or victimization in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan. The five supporting resource papers
(Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-Being; Mitigating Acutely Elevated Risk
of Harm; Performance Measures for Community Safety and Well-Being; and Collaborative
Analysis for Systemic Improvements) outline the proposed strategies and the goals and objectives
of The Ontario Working Group on Collaborative, Risk-Driven Community Safety. The final
report, Gaining Momentum (2015), clarifies key concepts, examines the implementation of
collaborative initiatives, and makes suggestions for moving forward.
Based on an in-depth thematic analysis of these documents, the present chapter answers
the following research questions: (1) How do OWG documents want Situation Tables to operate
and contribute to the broader goals of community safety and well-being? (2) What role does the
state hold within this new plural landscape of community safety? And; (3) What are the
foreseeable implications for the communities that these initiatives serve? From my analysis, I
argue that the police hold an important ‘steering’ role in the promotion and regulation of
community safety and the mitigation of risk, that, in turn, works to place responsibility for these
efforts on service providers and clients of Situation Tables. Finally, I argue that the way in which
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community safety and responsibilization have been conceptualized within the OWG documents
serves to mitigate risk for some members of the community while further marginalizing others.
Within what follows, I first discuss how the state has been utilized to shape key concepts
within the framework of collaborative, risk-driven community safety and well-being. I then
discuss how these shapings and the promotion of risk mitigation and community safety by public
police have served to demonstrate that Situation Tables are a state-centric mobilization of the
community. Next, I discuss how Situation Tables have been structured to facilitate efforts to
responsibilize social service providers and at-risk members of the community as responsible for
risk mitigation. Finally, I discuss how Situation Tables present as collaborative networks of
service providers, however, the managerial undertone of these initiatives further marginalizes
those identified as being at AER.

The Economic Shaping of Risk Mitigation, Community Safety, and Well-Being
An analysis of OWG documents identifies the influential, and steering role, the state holds in
these new collaborative responses to community safety and well-being. The following quote
illustrates the central role played by police in the development of Situation Tables:
[The Ontario Working Group] emerged in 2013 out of the spontaneous collaboration of
four Ontario police services and their community partners – all of whom sought to
resolve local challenges to crime and social disorder in more effective and efficient
ways (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 7).
The OWG acquired the capacity to “generate original research through the financial support,
moral encouragement, and intellectual leadership of the Ontario Ministry of Community Safety
and Correctional Services” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 7). The quality of the work of the OWG
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also resonated with Ontario’s policing community, so much so, that the “Community Safety and
Crime Prevention standing committee of the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police invited the
OWG to serve it, virtually as a subcommittee” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1E, pg. 6). As these
quotes demonstrate, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services has been
utilized to fund and provide intellectual direction to the OWG and its police partners have been
utilized to provide further influence in both developing and promoting community safety for the
purposes of risk mitigation. Further, through the financial support of the Ministry of Community
Safety and Correctional Services, the OWG has established pilot projects across Ontario and
produced reports and resource papers for guiding the development and implementation of present
and future Situation Tables across the province (Russell & Taylor, 2014). In providing funding
and intellectual direction to the OWG, the state has secured a central role in developing Situation
Tables and utilizing them to serve the interests of the state. Those interests being – reduced risk
and extended control.
The Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-Being (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the framework’) was among one of the first resource papers to be produced by the OWG. The
framework is a “risk-driven model for planning community safety and well-being” that sets the
tone for collaborative risk-driven intervention (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 14). An image of
the framework was presented as Figure 1 within Chapter Two, but has also been included below,
for ease of reference.
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Figure 1: The Framework for Planning Community Safety and Well-Being
(Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A)

The framework “encourages municipalities to plan for community safety and well-being at four
levels of intervention: social development, prevention, risk intervention, and emergency
response” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 1). The framework argues that,
social development, prevention, and risk intervention (green, blue, and amber zones,
respectively) really give the community a chance to reduce harms and the demand for
emergency response because they force everyone to anticipate threats to safety and
well-being (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 14, emphasis added).
Of interest in the above quote, is the emphasis placed on ‘everyone’ being responsible for
anticipating threats to ‘reduce harms’ and ‘the demand for emergency response’. In order to
anticipate threats, the OWG emphasizes the importance of identifying risk factors associated
with crime and victimization.
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Within the OWG documents, risk is broadly defined as “basic threats to safety, as well as,
social disorder and crime” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 9). Central within the framework is
the ‘mitigation’ of risk to prevent harm and/or victimization. Risk mitigation has been framed
within the amber ring of the framework as a strategy to promote community safety. The
following quote demonstrates how risk mitigation is perceived to enhance community safety:
identifying elevated risk situations and mobilizing immediate interventions to mitigate
those risks, have significant potential to reduce subsequent demands for emergency
response (thereby reducing harm, victimization, and the costs of emergency response)
(Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 6, emphasis added).
In the quote above, risk mitigation is linked with the ‘potential to reduce demands for emergency
response’. The attention is placed on resources, claiming that a mobilized response, in turn,
reduces ‘harm, victimization, and the costs of emergency response’. This focus on reduced
demands for emergency response, in general, and emergency responders, more specifically,
draws attention to both the economic shaping of community safety, as well as, the increasing
responsibility that is placed on other agencies to mitigate risk.
By focusing on multiple risk factors, Situation Tables, “attract the attention and support
of many more agencies, organizations, and potential sources for dollars, space, and other
resources” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 45, emphasis added). Situation Tables, therefore, reduce
the demand for emergency response by responsibilizing service agencies for not only risk
mitigation, but also the costs (i.e., the ‘dollars, space, and other resources’) necessary for
continued risk management.
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The economic shaping of community safety is further evidenced by the unique focus of
the Situation Table being studied. While all Situation Tables seek to identify persons at acutely
elevated risk, the present Table is also focused on,
identifying ‘frequent flyers’ (those individuals who repeatedly require emergency room
assistance, frequently get apprehended by police, and continue to make decisions that
put themselves and others at repeated risk of significant levels of harm). They use the
collaborative energies of the situation table to develop a multi-agency strategy in hopes
of reducing the demand for emergency response and saving people from harm (Russell
& Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 7).
As the above quote demonstrates, this Situation Table has been implemented in order to reduce
the substantial costs affiliated with frequent interventions by police. As the “growing dialogue on
the economics of community safety requires” we must seek ways to ensure that collaborative
responses operate “at the highest levels of efficiency and responsiveness available” with regards
to mitigating risk within Ontario communities (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 5).

State-Centric Role in Mobilizing the Community
As described above, concerns regarding the economics of policing have provided support
for the development and implementation of Situation Tables across Ontario. As such, the
Ministry of Community Safety, the OACP, and the OWG play a significant role in “the broader
goal of safety promotion” while still drawing “many more community players into the mix to
achieve safety and well-being” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 10). Based on an in-depth analysis
of the OWG reports, it is apparent that the police hold a particularly important role in reshaping
community life because “police have a diverse range of targets for their engagement and
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mobilization capabilities” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 19). The OWG states that “we need to
rely on police to get the rest of us to be more responsive, more effective, more collaborative, in
applying multi-sectoral and long-term strategies for increasing everyone’s safety and well-being”
(Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 9). Mobilization is therefore perceived to be “an appropriate role
for police” and “the rest of us have to collaborate on social development” (ibid).
In this sense, the ‘steering’ of initiatives is an appropriate role for police, while the rest of
the service agencies should do the ‘rowing’. More specifically, it is stated that, “effective
prevention of harm and victimization is going to require assisting and encouraging a whole raft
of human and social service agencies and organizations to do things in new ways that will
increase their efficiency, their effectiveness, and the sustainability of those effects” (Russell &
Taylor, 2014, pg. 17, emphasis added). This quote fits with the nautical analogy of state
‘steering’ and agency ‘rowing’ framed by Crawford (2006) regarding the mechanics of statecentric plural policing networks.
When implementing a Situation Table, community partners must “make decisions about
the priority risk factors to deal with” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 23). By establishing these
priorities, “all actions going forward are designed to reduce those risks” (ibid). Risk factors refer
to “any and all negative characteristics or conditions that: impinge upon individuals, families,
locations, groups, communities or society; and, increase the probability of harm or victimization”
(Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 5). It is the “accumulation or interaction of multiple risk factors that
increase the potential for harm and victimization” when demonstrated by individuals in the
community (ibid). As described in Chapter Two, there are approximately 100 risk factors put
forth by the Ministry. These risk factors are grouped under broader risk categories, such as:
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criminal involvement, substance abuse issues, anti-social behaviour, physical violence, mental
health, and family circumstances (Community Safety and Well-Being Planning Framework).
Although “many agencies, organizations, and individuals have invaluable information
about local risks to safety and well-being”, police occurrence data and the creation of provincial
risk factors that revolve around these data have been utilized to ‘steer’ initiatives (Russell &
Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 29). Police are believed to be “uniquely situated when it comes to
identifying accumulating risk factors” because “by examining routine information flows, such as
complaints, calls for service, witness accounts, by-law infractions, and street checks, patterns can
be revealed that give early warning of situations that may be escalating towards disorder, crime,
or harm” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1D, pg. 3, emphasis added). In this way, police have utilized
their capital as knowledge brokers to leverage their position within the network (Dupont, 2004).
The state has been central in developing the mechanisms by which risk is to be identified and
watched, coinciding with the literature regarding how the state often develops “mechanisms for
checking, verifying and monitoring performance against the goals, norms and values set”
(Crawford 2006, pg. 453). Thus, police play a central role in this collaborative model by
identifying accumulating risk factors and utilizing the Table to act as a form of social control
with the service providers that are involved and the individuals that are brought forward.

Responsibilizing Members of the Community for Risk Mitigation
Within the documents, the OWG has “moved well past the old presumption that safety is
primarily a police matter” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 19) and re-conceptualized safety as a
“community responsibility” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 16). There has been a shift in focus,

49

from crime, offenders, and harmful incidents (which require police and other emergency
responders) to anticipation of risk that anyone in the community might be harmed or
victimized by any number of risk factors (which require collaborative efforts by
multiple sectors of public and community services) (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 10).
This shift in focus underlies the theory supporting collaborative risk-driven intervention and
serves to justify responsibilization, as the priority changes from ‘crime prevention’ to ‘safety
promotion’. Safety promotion, by definition, “requires that harms or victimization from any
source be prevented, and equitable opportunities for quality of life be advanced” (Russell &
Taylor, 2015, pg. 10). Situation Tables are described as being “an excellent tactic in the new
transformation from crime prevention to safety promotion because: 1) [they are] risk driven; 2)
[they] benefit from the value-added of interagency collaboration; and 3) [they] result in a
reduction in harm and victimization” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 11). Moving the focus away
from ‘crime prevention’ and towards ‘safety promotion’ is, I would argue, an important
rhetorical strategy that takes the responsibility off of traditional policing and “its costs and
effectiveness, to a consideration of the roles and responsibilities of virtually everyone else in the
community” in order to proactively mitigate a spectrum of risk factors with the potential to cause
harm (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 10). The following quote nicely illustrates this shift in
responsibility, as it:
takes the onus off of police who for years in Ontario have shouldered the responsibility
for crime prevention, and draws every other office of local governance and human and
social service agencies into the foremost mission of mitigating risk and ensuring safety
and well-being for all (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 9, emphasis added).
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Crime prevention is more about stopping something bad from happening, whereas, safety
promotion is about doing something good – the intended appeal of safety promotion being that
service providers are mobilizing their resources to ensure ‘safety and well-being for all’. While
the above quote identifies the important role ‘local governance and human and social service
agencies’ hold for ‘mitigating risk’, the OWG further argues that all “community-based
organizations and the at-risk residents themselves” are also responsible for risk mitigation
(Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 9). From this analysis, we see how Situation Tables work to
responsibilize other service providers with the task of predicting risks to safety, as well as,
mitigating such risks. It is stated that when providers become responsible for risk mitigation,
at-risk subjects can be more effectively and more expeditiously connected to the
services they need most to avert their impending point of crisis. What’s more, this
process can be undertaken without new resources or expenditures, as the professionals
are essentially discharging their current responsibilities, albeit in much less
conventional ways (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 11).
The justification is a shared responsibility for community safety and well-being that service
providers are to buy into because “no single agency can mitigate all risks” and “[community
safety] is everyone’s responsibility” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 24).
Altering the focus away from ‘preventing crime’ – a role largely managed by police –
toward ‘ensuring safety and well-being’ takes responsibility away from police and places it onto
other community members. As the OWG notes, while police still have to respond to any and all
threats to personal and/or public safety, “they are not qualified to rectify more profound
community problems” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 9, emphasis added). This is an interesting
and important shift as it describes the primary role and responsibility of police to be that of
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fighting crime as opposed to fostering community safety, more broadly – something they are
described as ‘not qualified to rectify’. As such, Situation Tables serve to “coalesce a motivated
and coordinated army of diverse human services and resources to tackle the roots of crime and
disorder” (ibid) and address these community problems.
Further, the OWG proposes that “we need to engage in collaborative, multi-sector
strategies for implementing community, neighbourhood, and individual measures that can help
people develop healthy lifestyles, and make life decisions that ensure their own and others
safety” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 6, emphasis added). This quote implies that individuals, and
more specifically those at acutely elevated risk, are responsible for mitigating ‘their own’ risk
factors to ensure community safety. As the OWG further notes, “we can refer, encourage, and
guide [at-risk individuals] in accessing supports, so that they do everything within their own
power to prevent victimization when risk factors elevate” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 10).
Elevated levels of risk, the OWG argues, will not change unless the people “living, working, and
playing [in communities] take more responsibility for their own safety and well-being” (Russell
& Taylor, 2015, pg. 87). Thus, Situation Tables purportedly operate through police utilizing their
capabilities to effect crime control ‘at a distance’ by responsibilizing service providers and atrisk individuals to engage in their own risk mitigation.

Targeting Interventions and Measuring ‘Effectiveness’
In addition to putting forth the framework for developing Situation Tables, the OWG also
proposes ways to evaluate these initiatives. More specifically, OWG documents emphasize the
importance of tracking harmful incidents that are avoided by risk intervention and measuring
changes in risk status “to help the community decide if it is any safer and healthier because of
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these efforts” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 32). In order to assess ‘efficiency’ and to
measure these changes, the OWG recommends that,
if a community chooses to organize a Situation Table, attended weekly by 20 frontline
professionals from as many acute care agencies, to intervene on situations of acutely
elevated risk before they become harmful or victimizing incidents, then police might
want to track changes in calls for service and types of occurrences in target
neighbourhoods (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1B, pg. 4, emphasis added).
The above quote provides a number of important insights into Situation Tables. First, it
reinforces the ‘steering’ role held by police within these initiatives. As described above, police
data are proposed to both identify risk and evaluate whether risk mitigation is effective. By using
police data for identifying individuals ‘at risk’ or ‘frequent flyers’, the Table can be seen as
being utilized to police those they deal with the most (i.e., the usual suspects). Second, using
police calls for service as a measure of ‘effectiveness’ demonstrates how the economics of
policing agenda is a driver of these initiatives. Third, this quote identifies how Situation Tables
are focused on ‘target neighbourhoods’ – where marginalized at-risk individuals are ‘living,
working, and playing’. Within the OWG documents, these target neighbourhoods are framed as
areas where “people [are] living in marginalized conditions where police are responding most
often to anti-social behaviour, and sometimes crime” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 87). Situation
Tables, therefore, appear to be focused on re-targeting those who are more visibly problematic.
To aid Situation Tables in identifying and tracking risk, the OWG promoted the use of
the Risk Tracking Database (RTD). The RTD is a quantitative database that was originally
developed by the Ministry in Saskatchewan and has recently been adopted by the Ministry in
Ontario, which offers “each community an evidence-based source for ongoing analysis of the
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root causes and risk issues being presented” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1C, pg. 11). The RTD is a
standardized measure of performance that tracks the following quantitative variables:
demographic variables, risk factors, originating agencies, lead agencies, assisting agencies, and
concluding reasons. Concluding reasons reflect why a situation gets ‘closed’ at the Table.
Examples of concluding reasons include: an individual and/or family was connected to services
(cooperative), informed about services, unable to be located, or refused services (uncooperative)
(Babayan et al., 2015).
The Risk Tracking Database was designed by the Ministry to assist Tables in evaluating
the effectiveness of their initiative. In addition to the RTD, the OWG also recommends that
Tables track specific ‘performance measures’ within the realm of risk mitigation. Mitigated risk
means “reducing or alleviating it. The net result being that those who were once at high
probability of significant harm, are no longer” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1B, pg. 20). The OWG
proposes that risk mitigation can be achieved through removing the risk, removing the
opportunity for harm, and/or protecting the vulnerable. “Usually elements of all three figure in
any single intervention” (ibid). However, the majority of the performance measures, put forth by
the OWG, focus on securing community safety (e.g., removing risks and opportunity for harm)
with less attention being placed on addressing well-being (e.g., protecting vulnerable groups). An
emphasis has been placed on quantitatively measuring performance. For example, the OWG
suggests Tables measure: the frequency of victimizing events, the number and type of risks
identified, and the number and type of at-risk individuals helped. The sole performance measure
proposed by the OWG that offers potential for qualitative measurement, pertains to the “quality
of interventions” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1B, pg. 21). ‘Effectiveness’ should not be based
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solely upon quantitative measures of performance (e.g., reduced calls for police service) and
organizational outputs because,
if we try only to thwart those who are inclined to break the law, we will miss far more
opportunities to reduce harm and victimization, to reduce the cost of emergency
response, and to have a positive influence on the social conditions that foment social
disorder and crime in the first place (Russell & Taylor, 2014, pg. 8, emphasis added).
While most of the OWG documents emphasize the importance of police data for both identifying
individuals at acutely elevated risk and evaluating the effectiveness of the initiative, the quote
above also identifies concern that these initiatives, if not attended to closely, can work to police
the usual suspects by only ‘thwart[ing] those who are inclined to break the law’ while not
addressing the broader systemic problems that foster risk in the first place. As such, the OWG
highlights the need for first-hand information from those identified as being at acutely elevated
risk because the genuine impact for at-risk individuals cannot be reflected through a drop-down
menu in a risk tracking database (Russell & Taylor, 2015). To date, there is very little first-hand
knowledge available regarding the outcomes of initiatives, which, I argue, serves to further
marginalize those at-risk because they become perceived as both the problem and the solution.
Throughout the OWG documents, ‘community safety’ and ‘well-being’ are not clearly
defined nor differentiated; instead they are treated as being one in the same and ‘for all’. Within
the risk intervention ring of the framework (see Figure 1 above), the safety of certain members
of the community appears to be prioritized over the well-being of others. This prioritization
relates back to the objective of risk intervention, which is predominantly to identify individuals
that pose an elevated risk and to intervene in order to reduce that level of risk, thereby promoting
safety for others (i.e., avoiding potential harm) while not necessarily addressing the underlying
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causes of risk. More specifically, risk intervention is aimed at “identify[ing] persons at imminent
risk of harm or victimization and customiz[ing] interventions to reduce those risks before an
emergency response is required” (Russell & Taylor, 2015, pg. 84). As such, Situation Tables
appear to take an ‘individualized’ approach to community safety by focusing on individual
persons identified as being at ‘imminent risk’. This individualized approach is particularly
interesting given the fact that, “all the risk intervention and prevention strategies in the world
will be insufficient to keep up with social disorder and crime – unless we successfully tackle
their causes” (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1A, pg. 12). By conceptualizing the ‘causes’ of social
disorder and crime on a micro level, macro-level causes that exist beyond the control of the
individual are rendered invisible. Further, by focusing on tactics that produce short-term outputs
(i.e., mitigated risk), the potential for long-term outcomes is disregarded.
Discussions regarding community well-being, specifically, are reserved for the social
development ring of the framework (see Figure 1 above), where the underlying causes of crime
and disorder are acknowledged as needing to be addressed, in order to make an impact longterm. Taken together, risk mitigation and social development promote community safety and
well-being. However, risk mitigation and community safety have been the focus and thus serve
to promote securing control over providing care. The managerial focus on quantitative measures
of performance and the emphasis on responsibilization and social control reinforces the central
role of the police, while further marginalizing the role of the client. For example, OWG
documents suggest that Situation Tables “allow high risk individuals with composite needs to
gain access to services that they otherwise would not receive” and in making this connection
with services – risk is mitigated (Russell & Taylor, 2014, 1C, pg. 2). Marginalized members of
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the community are therefore doubly marginalized, in that they are responsibilized for their
elevated risk on the one hand, while not consulted about their needs or experiences on the other.

Discussion
A close analysis of OWG documents demonstrates how Situation Tables present as statecentric plural policing networks (Crawford, 2006). Police are identified as being in the best
position to utilize a risk-based model to mobilize the community around community safety and
well-being. Police are also identified as being in the best position to identify situations of acutely
elevated risk (AER) that need to be intervened upon and mitigated, thereby leveraging their role
in the network (Dupont, 2004). Police hold an important ‘steering’ function in the facilitation of
Situation Tables, while at the same time recognizing the need for social service agencies to
majorly shoulder responsibility: “social service agencies [are] engaged by police to address
situations of acutely elevated risk in more effective and efficient ways” (Russell & Taylor, 2015,
pg. 86). Upon agencies being engaged, police further control measures of performance for the
mitigation of risk by relying upon the Risk Tracking Database (RTD). The RTD produces
performance measures that revolve around initiative efficiency and organizational accountability
(i.e., quantitative outputs). These outputs, however, do not reflect the implications of Table
intervention for individuals at risk (i.e., qualitative outcomes). Police, therefore, “mobilize
connections” and “connect, direct, and influence” Situation Table plural policing networks
(Brewer, 2015, pg. 9). Yet, by utilizing police data to both identify persons at AER and to
evaluate the effectiveness of initiatives, there are concerns that Situation Tables can further
marginalize those at-risk by focusing on outputs and persons most known to police.
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CHAPTER FIVE – UTILIZING THE CPRIT AS A TECHNOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
Introduction
The organizational framework that has been put forward by the OWG leads us to wonder
how these networks have been put into practice, and by extension, what the perceived
implications of Situation Tables are for communities and the clients they serve. Building upon
the findings of my document analysis, I conducted seven semi-structured interviews with service
providers involved with one urban Situation Table – the CPRIT – to understand (1) how it is
perceived to be operating in practice, and (2) what its implications are perceived to be. From my
analysis, I argue that service providers’ experiences exemplify the ‘steering’ role of the state in
utilizing the Table to facilitate responsibilization for risk mitigation among service providers and
individuals identified as being at AER. As a result, the CPRIT extends state control by
institutionalizing social control in social service agencies. Further, the managerial undertone
guiding the implementation of the Table and the reliance on quantitative measures of
performance, serve to marginalize individuals at risk.
Within what follows, I first discuss how the police have been utilized to ‘steer’ the
CPRIT and extend state control by mobilizing members of the community around risk mitigation
and governing ‘at a distance’. I then discuss how state ‘steering’ has led to the responsibilization
of service providers and individuals identified to be at AER. Next, I discuss how the CPRIT
presents as a collaborative network, but upon closer examination, has a managerial undertone.
Finally, I discuss how this managerial undertone further marginalizes those deemed at risk.

58

Extending State Control by Governing ‘at a distance’
The municipal police service played a leading role in developing and implementing the
CPRIT and they have continued to maintain a leading role in mobilizing community members
and evaluating the initiative. As one participant explains,
In the beginning, police were referring most of the – like 70% of cases – because they
started this. They are spearheading this. Originating agencies are the ones that refer –
police are the top – still number one – then we have [neighbouring police service].
Those are the top two (Participant 4, emphasis added).
As evidenced above, the police (‘originating agencies’) are central figures at the Table. They are
the agency who ‘spearheaded’ the initiative. Further, they continue to be the top referring
agency, bringing the majority of situations to the attention of the Table.
Interestingly, many participants explained how the police are in the best position to
identify elevated risk, but are not the best to mitigate it. As one participant states,
The vast majority of the people that [police] are dealing with [are in crisis], in the
community. So [they] are probably best suited to bring people to the Table. Police
services, in general, are. [However] there is very little follow-up that the police can
do…[they] are not social workers…so being able to offer suggestions in that sense is
generally not [their] role (Participant 2).
As demonstrated above, the participant perceives police to be increasingly called upon to deal
with people who are in crisis in the community and notes how these calls are not police-related
matters (i.e., ‘they are not social workers’). In this way, police are not responsible for the
management of these calls for service. Instead, the responsibility is placed on other agencies to
manage acutely elevated risk.
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As another participant working in the social service discipline explains,
We haven’t brought a lot of clients to the Table and I think a lot of counselling agencies
would be on board with that because we do the counselling, right? It is the people that,
kind of, police and that who see this person in crisis, but have nothing to offer. They are
just – they are limited in that” (Participant 1, emphasis added).
Similar to the previous participant, this participant recognizes different agencies as being more
appropriate for referring people to the Table than others. For the participant above, the police are
best suited to refer people to the Table because they ‘see’ them, but do not provide counselling to
them as they are ‘limited’ in what they can offer. From these quotes, it appears that acutely
elevated risk is connected to people who are frequently seen and in contact with police. In this
way, service providers that counsel and work with clients are perceived to be least likely to bring
someone forward. Because, as the following participant illustrates,
if an organization has covered all of their avenues and they do not have any more
resources, or if they have done everything that they can – that’s when they bring it to the
Table (Participant 3).
Making referrals to the Table should therefore be a last resort for these other agencies.
For many participants, there was a recognition that the police come into contact with
people at elevated risk because risk that is left unmitigated presents as a form of social disorder.
By appearing ‘on the radar’ (Participant 4) and making contact with police, at-risk individuals
trigger the need for social control. As the following participant explains,
if you provided services and then all of a sudden that person, like 6 months later,
appears on the radar – the police bring it back saying – we have to, again, intervene
(Participant 4, emphasis added).
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The Table process is therefore utilized to instill social control and risk management on those
where “there’s a marked departure from normal behaviour” (Participant 2). By appearing on the
radar and making contact with police, the CPRIT gets utilized as a technology of social control.
The use of the CPRIT as a technology of social control can be seen when participants
discussed the objective of the Table. For example, many participants were unable to differentiate
between ‘community safety’ and ‘crime prevention’ and they often used these terms
interchangeably. The following quote illustrates the conflation of these two terms:
it’s community safety, it’s crime prevention, it’s also to eliminate some of those chronic
users of policing (Participant 6, emphasis added).
Although Situation Tables are presented by the OWG as a strategy to promote community safety
and well-being (Russell & Taylor, 2014; Russell & Taylor, 2015), the everyday practice of these
Tables paints a different picture. Through state-centric steering, the CPRIT has been informed by
traditional policing practices that have led it to be used as a technology of social control to police
the “usual suspects” (Participant 5). In fact, initially, when CPRIT launched the Table they,
were concerned about frequent fliers. By frequent flyer, what we’re referring to – it’s
kind of an euphuism for people who are habitually users of health care, social
assistance, emergency services dollars, and the services that go along with them. Police
services is no different (Participant 2, emphasis added).
This framing of ‘frequent fliers’ serves to target marginalized members of the community that
are heavy users of service, who are deemed to be at acutely elevated risk.
As described above, a main objective of the CPRIT is ‘to eliminate some of those chronic
users of policing’ and to reduce crime and disorder. Thus, the CPRIT, while being designed to
identify and mitigate acutely elevated risk, is used on the ground as a technology of social
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control on those who are visibly in crisis and in frequent contact with the police. Police refer the
majority of individuals to the CPRIT and then continue to manage these individuals through
other service providers, institutionalizing social control. As the following participant explains
regarding utilizing the Table to police these individuals from afar,
[Police] have had persons who have presented with 400 calls for service, as individuals,
that 6 months after intervention – they’re not on [police] radar anymore (Participant 2).
In this way, the Table is focused on preventing criminality and securing order through agencies.
Participant 1 further explains that the goal of the CPRIT is,
to try and get [individuals] connected to services, so that the police aren’t having to
go…[and in doing so]…the community becomes safer because these individuals are
being connected.
As described in the quote above, community safety is equated with mitigated risk. Yet, risk
mitigation is the responsibility of social service providers and those identified as being at AER,
once connected. As the following quote demonstrates,
frequent fliers are often at acutely elevated risk because there is something going on in
their life and they are putting themselves at risk (Participant 6, emphasis added).
By placing the blame on individuals for ‘putting themselves at risk’, it becomes easier to make
these individuals responsible for risk mitigation. As the following participant further explains,
once they’re connected to services, that, for us – risk being mitigated is connected to
services. Long story, short. We’ve made that connection. Are they going to follow
through with it or not? We don’t know, but they are no longer our concern. They are
now the individual agencies’ concern (Participant 2, emphasis added).
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Within this collaborative partnership, as described above, risk mitigation is reached when
individuals are connected to services. At that point they are ‘no longer a concern’ (Participant 2)
for the Table, but instead, become the responsibility of the agency. Thus, it appears that the role
of the police is to identify risk (state ‘steering’) while the role of the other service providers is to
act as a resource to mitigate risk (agency ‘rowing’). Here, the Table extends state control by
enabling police to govern ‘at a distance’ by displacing responsibility for social control onto other
service providers. The CPRIT therefore acts as a technology of social control.

Responsibilizing Service Providers and At-Risk Individuals
The CPRIT operates by responsibilizing service providers and individuals for risk mitigation.
The process of responsibilization for service providers occurs both formally, through the Table
and its four filter process, and informally, through the interpersonal relationships that are
established by the Table (see Chapter Two for a description of the four filter process). As one
participant explains, “that is kind of the unintended effect of the initiative – those people we’re
able to connect beyond this initiative” (Participant 4). Even if a situation is presented to the
Table and it does not meet the threshold of acutely elevated risk, service providers are still being
responsibilized outside of the Table process. As the following participant explains,
There would always be people at that Table that would turn around and say – I’ll tell
you what, it’s rejected here, but call this number (Participant 3).
Connections are therefore facilitated through regular Table meetings, which can then be
leveraged to manage individuals who do not meet the AER threshold. The following quote
further illustrates the informal responsibilization process enabled by the Table:
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I think what it [has] created is a pathway where this person, who is chronically
connected to police services, isn’t at acutely elevated risk, but because we are all at the
Table anyway – [police] can lean over to the person from the Mental Health Association
and say – what do you think we should do? And likely the person from the Mental
Health Association is already acquainted with that individual and can make those
connections (Participant 5, emphasis added).
Of interest in the quote above is the way that the Table, both formally and informally, assists
with working with those who are ‘chronically connected to police services’. In this way, even if a
situation is rejected (i.e. not classified as AER), the Table can facilitate informal social control,
further extending the reach of the state and its ability to govern ‘at a distance’.
When a situation is accepted and an individual is classified as being at AER, lead and
assisting agencies are then assigned to provide immediate care. The lead agency becomes
responsibilized for spearheading the intervention (either at the individual’s home or at the
agency) and for reporting back to the Table with regards to the result. Lead agencies are the ones
that have a role to play in mitigating the risk factors that have been identified by the Table to be
acutely elevated. For the CPRIT,
in terms of lead agencies, you see typically 3 or 4 agencies being more active and taking
most of the cases (Participant 4).
The predominant lead and assisting agency, St. Leonard’s, provides community-based crisis
support in 72% of cases (Babayan et al., 2015). As one participant explains,
Whoever has gone out – whatever agency was, kind of, identified as being needed –
continually works with the person…once they are connected – they are connected with
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the agency that is going to deal specifically with the risk and they’ve got someone who
is going to check in on them (Participant 1, emphasis added).
The responsibility to ‘work with the person’ and ‘check in on them’ continues for service
providers post Table intervention, because as the following quote demonstrates, “the case is
closed to the Table, but it is not closed to the organizations that have taken on that person, or
people” (Participant 3). Thus, there is an element of organizational accountability to risk
mitigation that is assumed individually by member agencies, because “the responsibility would
be on the agency to do what they normally would do” (Participant 7). The following quote nicely
illustrates both the responsibilization and organizational accountability fostered by the CPRIT,
You’re relying on your community partners – there’s a huge amount of accountability
for our community partners. We’re expecting you to do your job. We’re expecting you
to follow through with this to the end – to a happy end – where this person is going to
be well again. Don’t drop the ball because if you drop the ball, we’re all going to know,
because they’re going to come back here. And you don’t want to be that person sitting
here with us all looking at you, going – you said everything was fine (Participant 2,
emphasis added).
The ‘huge amount of accountability’ and social strain (i.e. ‘don’t drop the ball
because…we’re all going to know’) for community partners to mitigate risk exerts
significant pressure on members of the CPRIT. The bottom line is that the initiative does not
want clients coming back to the attention of the Table. This creates an adversarial
atmosphere by placing pressure and responsibility for risk mitigation on service providers
from individual agencies, while taking responsibility and accountability away from the
broader initiative. As another participant explains, “if I was one of the agencies involved and
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I had a responsibility with that client, then I would do my own agency follow-up, based on
my own agency policies” (Participant 6). Intervention follow-up and client care are therefore
seemingly assumed by the lead agency because, at present, the CPRIT does not have any
follow-up processes in place.
The ‘Responsibilization’ of At-Risk Individuals
Individuals that are subject to CPRIT intervention are expected to connect with the
service providers that have attended the intervention, and accept the services that have been
offered to them. Because,
Once the intervention is done, it’s closed at the Table. That part of it is done and then
[the individuals] just do what they are supposed to – like whatever counselling, or
whatever they have connected with…We let the person know – we’re here, we’re
concerned, here’s what this agency can offer you. And we let them pick and choose
what they want (Participant 1, emphasis added).
As described above, there is an expectation that accompanies being connected with services,
which is, that individuals will ‘do what they are supposed to’ and be cooperative to mitigate risk.
Individuals are perceivably empowered by agencies to choose which services they want to take
part in. However, this empowerment is contingent upon individuals being willing to commit to
engaging with those services. In fact, individuals are often asked during the intervention process,
“what are you willing to do?” (Participant 7). The responsibility is therefore placed on at-risk
individuals to participate in risk mitigation. As the following participant explains,
There have been some [clients] that have not followed through. But at least you know
that they know what’s out there and how to contact the service, if they want it at a later
date (Participant 6).
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Thus, if risk is not mitigated, it is not because of a failure of the Table, but instead it is framed as
being the clients’ inability to accept help or follow through with the help being offered to them.
The following quote nicely illustrates this point:
For some people, I don’t think [intervention] does [mitigate risk] because they are not
ready. So we’ve caught them at a point where – they haven’t identified that they need it.
Or maybe, their life looks like a crisis, but for them – it’s not (Participant 1).
Individuals that refuse service are therefore perceived as being uncooperative, unready to
mitigate risk, and unwilling to accept support. Thus, those identified to be at acutely elevated
risk, “have to be in a place to be able to hear it” (Participant 1), because, “you can’t force people,
if they don’t want support” (Participant 6).
As described above, risk mitigation, and by extension community safety, become the
responsibility of the client. Removed from these discussions, however, is a consideration of the
conditions that place individuals at acutely elevated risk. Rather than looking at the broader
factors that have placed these individuals at acutely elevated risk and working to address these
larger systemic issues, the CPRIT works to responsibilize clients for their own risk mitigation.
When clients are resistant toward the process of responsibilization, members at the Table
actively work to bring these clients back in line:
I’ve had occasions where, the big professionals – what I call the big professionals –
have been counsellors to somebody and it’s been a case of I’ve gone in with a particular
angle and been able to talk with them and with that person and bring them back in
(Participant 3, emphasis added).
As described above, when clients are perceived to be resistant to participating in the process,
other members at the Table will work to ‘bring them back in’. Interestingly, when clients are
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perceived as being too difficult or challenging, agencies’ resistance to responsibilization has also
occurred. The following discussion by one social service provider illustrates this active
resistance to responsibilization,
some things I would refuse to participate in, because I knew that person would need far
more support than, let’s say, what our organizations could actually give (Participant 3).
As demonstrated in the quote above, service providers may resist responsibilization if they
perceive the client to be too difficult. In this way, members of the CPRIT, through efforts to
resist responsibilization, select clients who are likely to be successful and able to mitigate risk.

Managerial Culture of Risk Mitigation
As demonstrated above, as well as in Chapter Four, the state has played an active role in
shaping Situation Tables and steering the CPRIT. Public police, for example, have dictated the
threshold for determining acutely elevated risk. The AER threshold, for the CPRIT, is identified
as something that “has to be dealt with quickly, it’s more than we can handle on our own, and
it’s going to require a community response” (Participant 2). The AER threshold therefore
requires a situation to exhibit an imminent risk of harm and multiple risk factors that cut across
service disciplines. Further, the risk factors that are used to determine if an individual is at AER
have been dictated by the Ministry of Community Safety. They are “provincial risk factors. So
they are used across the province, in any Table that calls itself a Situation Table” (Participant 2).
These risk factors are utilized to identify “local risks to safety and well-being”. Therefore, the
managerial undertone, which promotes performance measures and a fixation on outputs versus
outcomes, dictates the AER threshold and the risk factors that are utilized in its determination.
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Acutely elevated risk, as a central concept to the enactment of the Table process, was
recognized by numerous participants as being difficult to define. As the following quote
demonstrates, service providers have varying perspectives that they bring to the Table.
It’s a challenge – and we’ve talked about this at our table – because everybody’s
threshold may be different. So not allowing that to come into play too much and
sticking to what the table identifies it as (Participant 7, emphasis added).
In order to control for varying perspectives and ‘thresholds’, service providers are to stick to the
AER threshold identified for the CPRIT. However, definitional challenges have created some
disagreements, with regards to whether situations should be determined as acutely elevated risk.
As the following quote demonstrates,
I think we all bring our lens with our – what we think is high risk – and then you have,
for the most part, everyone agrees (Participant 1).
In instances where there is disagreement, the Table operates under the assumption of majority
rules. By “going with the majority” (Participant 3), the interests of some Table members are
prioritized over others. Disagreements conceivably stem from the multi-disciplinary nature of the
CPRIT and the subjective experiences of those sitting at the Table. As the following participant
explains,
It could be their expertise in a particular field, that they may be questioning certain
aspects (Participant 3).
Participants also evidenced concern that the risk factors have been utilized to justify the need for
intervention, when it is not necessarily warranted. As the following quote illustrates,
I think we need to be a little bit more careful on what risk factors we are listing, so not
to double it up (Participant 1).
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The Table facilitates the presentation of situations of elevated risk and when these risk factors
are ‘doubled up’ (Participant 1) it makes the situation more likely to meet the AER threshold.
This collaborative partnership therefore appears to be ‘joined up’ but is internally fragmented
(Crawford, 2001).
Situation Tables, as indicated in the previous chapter, are intended to be delivered
through management techniques where performance measures and organizational outputs are the
criteria for measuring and determining success. The CPRIT embodies these management
techniques, by actively utilizing quantitative performance measures for determining and
evaluating its success. As the following participant explains,
There is one proxy indicator that can tell you if [the initiative is] doing good or not. It’s
the percentage of cases that are coming back to the table (Participant 4).
This quantitative measure of performance is populated by the Risk Tracking Database (RTD).
The RTD is a standardized forum that provides a way to track and analyze Table data efficiently.
It is an instrument that’s not only just for entering data, but then extracting and
analyzing. It includes a dashboard, which means once you enter [the data] you can pick
different variables and then report on them (Participant 4).
The implementation of the standardized RTD now allows the Chair of a Situation Table to
run their own statistical analysis of the data – thereby removing the need for impartial, external
evaluators. For example, the CPRIT originally had epidemiologists run analyses on the Table
data, but since the adoption of the RTD those analyses have stopped,
because [the table chair], kind of, made it clear to us that those basic stats – [she] would
be able to see that [herself] through the dashboard (Participant 4).
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The Table Chair can, therefore, pick and choose what she wants to report upon. The reasons for
‘concluding’ a situation at the Table, which is dictated by the pre-determined options in the
RTD, is one of the variables that is often reported upon. However, as Participant 4 explains,
the analysis just shows whatever is in the database – which is, that they connected that
individual or family to the agency. That’s it. We don’t know what’s happening after
that. That information is not available (Participant 4).
The above quote speaks to how the managerial undertone allows for the CPRIT to be utilized as
a form of social control because the focus is on concluding situations at the Table, by connecting
individuals with services.
This type of analysis, and its focus on efficiency (i.e., concluding cases), is both facilitated
by and reinforced through the Ministerial implementation of the RTD. As the following
participant explains, “the Ministry said – right now, their priority is to have that database in
place, to at least track the number of cases we are dealing with – not the impact” (Participant 4).
However, the RTD does not capture the entire picture, as it is “not enough to tell you whether
this initiative is actually progressing and if it’s actually effective in reducing risk – the number of
those risks and the level of those risks – for those families or individual cases” (Participant 4).
Further, being connected with services does not mean that individuals are actively engaged. As is
discussed above, at-risk individuals may not follow through once connected and this is not
tracked by the CPRIT. The Table process is utilized to mitigate risk ‘in the moment’, so in the
moment, individuals are connected with services, and “it reduces the risk so they no longer meet
the threshold” (Participant 6). The aftermath of risk-driven intervention is less of a concern. As
the following quote demonstrates,
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When a case comes to the Table it gets acutely elevated risk, people go out and do the
intervention, do the connections, and we close it at the Table. As far as the Table is
concerned, it’s done (Participant 1).
The Table does not ‘case manage’. As another participant explains, “it’s individuals – they don’t
call them clients – individuals getting connected to services” (Participant 7). By referring to the
clients of the CPRIT as individuals, the Table is able to keep itself at an arm’s length from being
held accountable. However, not having this longer term impact serves to promote securing
control (stabilizing risk) over providing care (addressing risk). Moreover, by only considering
the impact for individuals that have been connected with services, the experiences of those that
have refused services (i.e., have not been connected, but are perceivably still impacted by the
intervention process) are omitted.

Marginalizing At-Risk Individuals
In order to better assess risk mitigation and the initial impact the Table had on at-risk individuals,
the CPRIT implemented the Risk Factor Tracking Tool (RFTT):
We said, let’s come up with some sort of tool that we could give to the lead agency and
we would ask them to monitor at 1, 3, and 6 months. We would identify whatever risks
were identified…and we would ask them – can you just provide a status for each of
those risks? And then overall – has it been mitigated or is [AER] still present? We were
thinking, at minimum, some sort of tool that would quantify the impact (Participant 4).
However, the data that was obtained from the RFTT identified that the CPRIT lacked
sustainability in mitigating risk. As the following quote demonstrates,
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The limited data we had from the Risk Factor Tracking Tool suggests that many of
those risks were still present and they were all acutely elevated. So at 3 months or at 6
months – people were still having those risks…That means, they were able to
temporarily reduce those risks – to mitigate them – but there was no sustainability. This
suggests that people’s risk level doesn’t change – even after they are connected with
services and they are provided with services (Participant 4).
Shortly after the implementation of the RFTT, it stopped being utilized, and instead the Table
adopted the more standardized Risk Tracking Database (RTD) to measure performance.
Aside from the quantitative data provided by the RFTT, no qualitative data has been
collected from clients directly that can speak to their experiences with the CPRIT process. When
discussing this lack of qualitative feedback, one participant noted,
there’s part of me that wants to hear the feedback, but there’s part of me that recognizes
that we don’t need to see the feedback because the statistics, kind of, speak for
themselves…If they’re not on [police] radar, and they’re not on emergency services’
radar, and they’re not visiting [community services]…that speaks for itself, as to the
betterment of them as individuals and the betterment of their situation (Participant 2,
emphasis added).
Quantitative measures of performance are therefore prioritized over qualitative measures. Yet,
utilizing quantitative data to ‘speak for itself’ is exclusionary and presumptuous and results in
initiative ‘success’ being determined by the service providers and not the individuals at AER. As
Participant 4 explains, “right now [our understanding] is limited to those Table discussions and
that anecdotal evidence.” Anecdotal evidence is limited in that it can only speak to providers’
perceptions about the impact of the initiative. As the following quote demonstrates, clients are
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perceived to be receptive, “even if they only went into services for a little bit and it maybe only
stabilized some of the really big risks” (Participant 1). The impact of having risk “deescalated”
(Participant 3) is perceived by providers to be “powerful” (Participant 1) and a sign of success.
However, as Participant 3 acknowledges,
[Service providers] may not have lived that person’s life. They may not have
experienced some of the things that they have experienced. So you only get an outside
looking in, kind of view.
This gap in understanding the individual’s experience with the Table process and the impact of
risk-driven intervention is acknowledged by service providers, but not prioritized.
Acknowledgement of the need for the client voice is met with uncertainty regarding its
benefit and necessity. As one participant explains, when asked about whether or not the Table
obtains feedback from clients, “I don’t know at what point it would be beneficial to give a true,
kind of, reading” (Participant 1). As another participant explains, “some of the interventions are
so early, you don’t know what they are going to say or do, until later on” (Participant 2). Thus,
there appears to be a sense of protection over the initiative and the potential for negative
feedback. Numerous participants noted that many of the individual agencies, especially those
who are often lead agencies on interventions, have “their own satisfaction survey process in
place” (Participant 6). Acknowledging that agencies have their own satisfaction surveys in place
further reinforces the organizational accountability that is affiliated with the Table. By relying
upon individual agency satisfaction surveys, the CPRIT removes the clients’ ability to provide
feedback to the broader initiative, while rending the service providers from individual agencies
responsible for client success.
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The managerial focus of the CPRIT on performance-based outputs lends itself to database
tracking. As the following quote demonstrates, “the risk factors are there [in the RTD], so we can
see what’s working, or what may be needed within the community” (Participant 3). By tracking
prevalent risk factors, the Ministry can make decisions as to where to allot funding down the
road. As Participant 5 explains, however, a deeper level of analysis is desirable:
the creation of data is fascinating because what you have is a person describing a
scenario and then you have others ascribing risk factors…if we’re moving toward a
world where [Situation Table] data is the driver of social policy – that’s interesting – but
I think there needs to be that, kind of, second layer of analysis of what these risk factors
mean in their totality.
The creation of risk data is arguably subjective, in that, the risk factors that are ascribed to
individual situations are based upon service providers’ perceptions and these perceptions may
not adequately match those of at-risk individuals. As the following quote demonstrates, “[risk
factors] may not be accurate as to what the client’s perception is…they might not even have seen
it as risk” (Participant 7). Social policy decisions are subsequently made upon this risk data, as it
is taken to be a reliable measure, having serious implications for at-risk individuals without more
comprehensively examining their needs.
Risk data and risk-driven intervention are utilized to shape the social worlds of
marginalized individuals, without incorporating their input. As the following quote demonstrates
regarding the assumed impact of the CPRIT, “if people [don’t] come back up to the Table, then,
obviously, it made a difference” (Participant 1). The assumption that individuals are not coming
back to the Table because risk has been mitigated does not incorporate the client perspective and
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is based upon the notion that interventions are known to be best practices in reducing risk. Yet,
as another participant explains,
Risk is a rollercoaster – right? So levelling out one of the bumps in the rollercoaster – is
that eliminating risk? I think that’s the longitudinal, long-term piece, that has to be
explored…Did [intervention] address the risk that this person is experiencing?
(Participant 5).
By not obtaining the client perspective as to whether or not risk has actually been addressed, the
CPRIT serves to further marginalize the role of the at-risk individual. Thus, more systems-level
thinking is required, because, as the following quote demonstrates, “Is that person at acutely
elevated risk, or is this just a gap in the way that services are offered?” (Participant 5).

Conclusion
Through the processes of responsibilizing service providers and at-risk individuals for
risk management, the CPRIT has extended state control and operates as a technology of social
control by governing ‘at a distance’. Through the use of the Risk Tracking Database, the CPRIT
prioritizes quantitative performance measures and organizational outputs over qualitative
outcomes for the broader community. Situation Tables, therefore, promote stabilizing risk over
providing care, which speaks to the literature on plural policing and neoliberal governance
(Crawford, 2006; Garland, 1996). As a state-centric policing network, the CPRIT is utilized to
institutionalize social control in agencies that are traditionally responsible for providing care.
Through the processes of responsibilization, the CPRIT extends state governance into various
social domains. Further, by targeting Table interventions on ‘frequent fliers’ the Table operates
as a way to police the ‘usual suspects’ (Participant 5).
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In both the OWG documents and the interview transcripts, the role of the state in shaping
these initiatives is clear. There are numerous ways in which this state shaping has been instituted
in practice. For example, the police are referring the majority of the situations to the Table (state
‘steering’), while service providers are given the responsibility for providing the support (agency
‘rowing’). The state has also dictated the risk factors that are utilized to facilitate the Table
process and the database that is utilized to measure Table performance. Situation Table networks
are thereby ‘collaborating’ with a managerial undertone, in order to monitor performance against
the goals set. This performance-based measurement does not incorporate client experiences,
neglecting the potential for social development and, in the process, marginalizing individuals
deemed ‘at risk’. The state-centric framework proposed by the OWG is therefore closely coupled
with how the CPRIT is operating in practice. The implications of these findings, as well as,
avenues for future research will be discussed in the concluding chapter that follows.
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CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSION
Introduction
Within what follows, I begin by discussing how Situation Tables operate as novel
technologies of control that responsibilize social service providers and at-risk individuals for risk
mitigation. I then discuss the relevance of these findings to the literature on the managerial
culture of community partnerships, and the unintended consequences for individuals at risk.
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the practical implications of this study, and outline
avenues for future research.

Situation Tables as Novel Technologies of Control
Situation Tables present as state-centric networks that operate as ‘novel technologies of
control’ (Crawford, 2006) that extend state control through governing risk and policing the usual
suspects. Through plural policing networks, the crime control capacities of non-state actors are
used as modes of power that extend state control over the behavioural conduct of members of
society that pose a risk to the social order (O’Malley, 1992). Situation Tables utilize the
capacities of ‘non-state’ social service providers to extend control over the behavioural conduct
of individuals that present as being at acutely elevated risk, based upon risk factors that
exemplify crime and disorder. Risk mitigation, as a community safety and well-being tactic,
therefore becomes the responsibility of service providers involved with the initiative. The
process of responsibilizing service providers for risk mitigation is reinforced by the practices of
the CPRIT, which evidence the use of the Table as a form of traditional policing practice. By
institutionalizing social control, the state is able to govern risk ‘at a distance’ (Garland, 1996).
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Situation Tables also utilize the capacities of at-risk individuals themselves to mitigate
risk. By viewing these persons as rational actors, at-risk individuals can be responsibilized for
their own risk mitigation, while larger systemic issues that place them at risk are left buried and
underexplored (O’Malley, 1992). The process of responsibilizing individuals for risk mitigation
is also reinforced by the practices of the CPRIT, which views at-risk individuals as being
cooperative and willing to accept help, or uncooperative and unwilling. By focusing on the
negative effects of ‘risky behaviour’ as opposed to its contextual factors, service providers have
tended to adopt a neoliberal ideology regarding the management of risk that poses a threat to
public security (Liebenberg et al., 2015). However, individualizing risk and utilizing risk
mitigation on a micro level directs attention away from the social problems that facilitate risk on
a macro level and are beyond an individual’s control. Situation Tables are being utilized to
mitigate acutely elevated risk of harm, which places the focus on community safety and threats
to public security. Further, it reduces the crime problem to one of recalcitrant individuals
unwilling to accept offers of support (Scoular & O’Neil, 2007).
Based on my document analysis and in-depth interviews, it is apparent that the CPRIT is
operating as a state-centric network, wherein public police have leveraged their position as
knowledge brokers (Dupont, 2004). Yet, the state steering of Situation Tables raises serious
concerns about the democratic accountability in place for governing these new governance
networks. Without democratic accountability, the implications of pluralized crime control are not
considered for the organizations or the individuals involved (ibid). The CPRIT does not provide
at-risk individuals with the opportunity to give feedback as to the broader impact of the initiative.
Instead, feedback is limited to client satisfaction surveys distributed by member agencies, which
speak only to organizational accountability rather than accountability of the initiative. By not
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providing a feedback process, Situation Tables not only evade democratic accountability, but
‘community’ safety and ‘community’ mobilization become individualized.

Managerial Culture of Community Partnerships
Within actuarial risk-based models that assume ‘all action is calculable in terms of risk’,
there is a threshold that defines the level of risk that is ‘acceptable’ to ‘experts’ (Kelly, 2001;
Rose, 2000). For the OWG and the CPRIT, this threshold is acutely elevated risk (AER). Yet, to
date, there has been little research that explores how service providers perceive and respond to
actuarial risk-based models. There appears to be an imaginary moral consensus among agents of
control regarding what constitutes risk and how it should be calculated (Kelly, 2001). Further,
the consequences of the threshold of ‘acceptable’ risk for those subject to risk classification and
governance are not taken into consideration (Rose, 2000). Therefore, little is known about how
service providers construct risk and the implications these constructions have for those being
labeled ‘at risk’ (Goddard, 2012).
My findings speak to the challenges service providers experience when working within a
risk-based model and constructing AER, as varying perspectives were demonstrated by Table
members as to what constitutes acutely elevated risk for the CPRIT. These challenges have
further implications for those subject to risk constructions, because they take away individuals’
ability to offer their perspectives regarding risk constructions and the governance that follows.
Without input from those subject to the risk threshold and the conduct-governing practices that
result, the state maintains power (Rose, 2000). For the CPRIT, service providers are perceivably
accepting police definitions of risk as ‘experts’ and governing conduct by ‘mitigating AER’. In
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accepting these definitions and governing conduct based upon them, the state maintains power
over the CPRIT. This power is further asserted by not seeking input from clients of the Table.
Concepts like ‘community safety’ and ‘elevated risk’ are subjective in nature and do not
have universally agreed upon definitions. Yet, these concepts are still being measured within
community safety initiatives. Crawford (2001) found that ‘preventative measures’ were left
undefined in governing policy in the UK, so that the government would not have to contend with
the exclusionary dynamics that pervade community safety partnerships. The agencies involved in
these partnerships, therefore, must define and agree upon the ‘preventative measures’ that are to
be utilized to ensure ‘community safety’, despite varying perspectives on how to do so. For the
CPRIT, the concept of ‘acutely elevated risk’ has not been universally agreed upon by agencies
and yet, it is still utilized as a threshold for intervention. Risk-driven intervention is then utilized,
in turn, as a ‘preventative measure’ to ensure ‘community safety’.
The CPRIT, therefore, evidences a pluralization of policing and risk management without
a truly ‘networked’ approach. This uncoordinated dispersal of policing has resulted, in part, from
governing policy that is performance-based (Crawford, 2001; Hope, 2005). There is a managerial
culture that underlies risk mitigation, which fixates on efficiency and performance-based outputs
(Garland, 1996). The OWG put forth the framework that exerts control over partnered agencies,
by outlining performance measures and setting performance targets. Performance measures, such
as, police-recorded reductions in crime, and number of cases concluded in the RTD, foster
tunnelled-vision on organizational outputs rather than wide-angled responsibility for
‘community’ safety and well-being. Thus, broader social issues become ignored when initiatives
focus on what organizations have done, rather than the impact they have made. The burden of
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risk mitigation is placed on service providers and individuals at risk, without consideration of the
outcomes for communities.

Unintended Consequences for Individuals At-Risk
Service providers’ perception of at-risk individuals as rational and autonomous in their
decision to either engage or not engage with services, without consideration of contextual
factors, has resulted in serious repercussions for these individuals. As identified by Liebenberg et
al. (2015), at-risk individuals who did not present as ‘responsibilized’ were often banned from
further services. Both my analyses of the OWG documents and the interview transcripts confirm
that the process of responsibilization has been embedded within the intended operation of
Situation Tables, in general, and the perceived operation of the CPRIT, more specifically. The
unintended consequences of embedding responsibilization into the way that Situation Tables
operate is individuals become ‘blamed’ for the factors that place them at risk. When individuals
are blamed for adverse social conditions over which they have no control, social risk is
transformed into individual responsibility (Kelly, 2001). In addition, individuals perceived as
‘unwilling’ may not be brought to the Table and offered support services. Responsibilization
facilitates the ‘downward spiral’ of neoliberal governance, where responsibility completely shifts
from the state to the at-risk individual (ibid).
Within the literature on community safety, there is an overpowering emphasis on how
collaborative partnerships mitigate risk, with little exploration of how neoliberal principles of
governance impact service delivery for vulnerable at-risk individuals (Liebenberg et al., 2015).
And yet, despite the understudied emergence of collaborative approaches to risk intervention,
responsibility for failed intervention is likely to be attributed to the individual and unlikely to be
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attributed to the risk-based model of practice – a model which lacks an understanding of the
social processes at work and the complexities of client experiences – experiences that, if
considered, could have a greater impact on outcomes for vulnerable at-risk individuals (ibid).
Further, the CPRIT does not seek to obtain client feedback or explore the impact of initiatives,
but instead attributes failed interventions to resistant individuals and places accountability on
providers with regards to service delivery. By ‘empowering individuals’ to manage their own
risk and demonstrate self-care, accountability is removed from the state. However, by
implicating individuals in the regulation of their own self-care, the nature of support services
changes and this can result in exclusion and further marginalization for those at risk (Liebenberg
et al., 2015; Mann et al., 2007).

Practical Implications and Avenues for Future Research
The overlap in thematic areas among the OWG documents and the interview transcripts
illustrate how Situation Tables are operating as state-centric networks. Although this study has
provided qualitative insight into service providers’ perceptions with regards to the operation and
implications of Situation Tables, the client experience is still missing. The opportunity exists for
the CPRIT to introduce a client feedback survey, however, at the present time, the initiative does
not have the structure for this – as the state-centric framing has focused on stabilizing risk and
securing control, rather than addressing risk. In order to explore the client experience and to have
a greater impact on ‘outcomes’ for vulnerable populations ‘at risk’, future research must be
conducted with regards to collaborative, risk-driven community safety and well-being initiatives.
Situation Table clients need to be spoken with directly about their experiences. Without the
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client perspective, there is a significant gap in knowledge, which serves to further marginalize
these members of the community who are not given a voice.
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APPENDIX A – SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE
Interview Guide
Introductory Questions
I would like to begin by asking you a few introductory questions about your position and your
organization’s involvement with the Table.
1. Can you tell me a little bit about your position at this organization?
2. Can you please describe for me the services your organization offers the Table?
Defining Key Terms
I am very interested in gaining the service provider perspective on how acutely-elevated risk, as
a seemingly central concept to the implementation of Situation Tables, is defined.
Defining Acutely-Elevated Risk (AER)…
1. How do you define “acutely-elevated risk”?
2. How do you identify clients at “acutely-elevated risk”?
3. What “risk factors” need to be present for a client to be classified as at the “acutelyelevated risk” level?
4. Are there a certain number of “risk factors” that need to be present for a client to be
classified as at an “acutely-elevated risk” (ratio of risk to protective factors)?
5. In your opinion, are the “risk factors” utilized by the Table representative of clients at
“acutely-elevated risk”? Why or why not?
6. How has the threshold of “acutely-elevated risk” been determined by the Table?
7. Have there ever been disagreements regarding whether a situation meets the “acutelyelevated risk” threshold? If so, can you please provide an example?
8. In an Ontario Working Group document that discusses the implementation of Situation
Tables, this community was identified as using its Table to deal with “frequent fliers”.
A. First, can you explain what that means?
B. What type of response is provided to those classified as “frequent fliers” and how
does it, or does it not, differ from someone at “acutely-elevated risk”?
C. Do you have clients that you have referred to the Table that are frequent users of
emergency services and not necessarily at “acutely-elevated risk”?
Identifying the Purpose Served
I am also very interested in exploring what service providers perceive to be the purpose served
by the Table.
1. In your opinion, is the Table a crime prevention, or community safety strategy? Please
explain how so.
2. Does the Table support community safety? If so, how does it do this?
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3. Does the Table support client well-being? If it does, how? If it does not, why do you
think that?
Client Interventions and Follow-Up
As far as how client interventions are conducted…
1. Once a client has been identified as being at “acutely-elevated risk”, can you describe
how the process works?
A. Who leads the intervention?
B. Who goes to the house?
2. Have you ever attended one of these interventions? If you have, can you describe what
the experience was like for you?
A. What role did you play during and after the intervention?
3. In your opinion, do client interventions address (mitigate) risk?
A. If they do, how do they do this? If they do not, why not?
4. Is there any type of follow-up in place for clients that have come to the attention of the
Table?
A. What is the follow-up process? How often is it done (e.g. one week later, one month
later, six months later, a year)?
B. Is there follow-up for both clients that accept help, as well as, clients that decline
help? If so, can you describe how that works?
C. Who is responsible for this follow-up?
Describing the Impact for Clients
Now that the Table has been operating for over a year, I am also very interested in gaining the
service provider perspective on how you think the Table impacts the client.
1. From your perspective, how has the Table impacted individuals at “acutely-elevated
risk”?
2. Can you provide any real life examples of a client that you brought to the Table at an
“acutely-elevated risk” that would help me understand your answer just now about the
Table’s impact?
3. Do you have any thoughts about how client interventions take place?
A. What do you like about the process?
B. What do you think could be improved?
4. What have client responses been when you have shown up at the door? Can you provide
an example of one of these interactions?
5. For clients that have been brought forward but declined help, what does the process look
like after (i.e. blacklisted)?
6. Have you heard clients talk about their experience with the Table process? If you have,
what kinds of things did they say?
7. Is there a process in place to receive client feedback on these interventions?
A. If there is, how does this happen and who is responsible for conducting this?
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8. Do you believe that it would be beneficial to have client evaluation / feedback? If you do,
what might that evaluative process look like? If you do not, why not?
Utilizing the Risk Factor Tracking Tool (RFTT)
I understand that the Table utilizes the Risk Factor Tracking Tool and that this tool is still early
in its implementation. I am interested in understanding what this tool is, how it works, and what
its impact has been.
1. Can you describe what the Risk Factor Tracking Tool is, and how it works?
2. To your knowledge, is the Table utilizing the Risk Factor Tracking Tool?
3. How does the Risk Factor Tracking Tool determine that risk has been lowered?
A. Does client connection with services automatically mean risk has been lowered (i.e.
connection – mitigation)?
4. Since the implementation of the Risk Factor Tracking Tool, how has your contact with
your clients changed (if determined risk is still present post-intervention)?
Wrapping Up
That brings us to the end of our interview. I would like to thank you very much for taking the
time to speak with me today and ask you one final question before wrapping up.
1. Do you have anything that you wish to add that we have not had the opportunity to
discuss?
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